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INTRODUCTION
At least nine drivers of taxicab, livery, and rideshare vehicles have
committed suicide since November 2017, due to financial problems:
Lu Wu (March 23, 2019); 1 Roy Kim (November 5, 2018); 2 Fausto
Luna (September 26, 2018); 3 Abdul Saleh (June 15, 2018); 4 Yu Mein

1. Georgett Roberts & Amanda Woods, Lyft Driver Found Dead in Back of Car
as Cabbie Suicide Epidemic Continues, N.Y. POST (Mar. 23, 2019, 4:45 PM),

https://nypost.com/2019/03/23/cabbie-suicide-epidemic-continues-as-ninth-manfound-dead-in-back-of-car/ [https://perma.cc/9JL4-PBY7].
2. Danielle Furfaro & Gabrielle Fonrouge, Another NYC Cab Driver Deep in
Debt
Kills
Himself,
N.Y.
POST
(Nov.
14,
2018,
3:16
PM),
https://nypost.com/2018/11/14/another-nyc-cab-driver-deep-in-debt-kills-himself/
[https://perma.cc/ARK7-PHWP].
3. Id. At a vigil held in honor of the driver on October 7, 2018 the City’s Taxi &
Limousine Commissioner Meera Joshi attended to pay her respects, but was chased
away by cursing and shouting attendees, some of whom blamed her for the recent
suicides. Tyler Pager & Emily Palmer, Uber Driver’s Death Marks Seventh For-Hire
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
7,
2018),
Driver
Suicide
Within
a
Year,
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“Kenny” Chow (May 23, 2018); 5 Nicanor Ochisor (March 16, 2018); 6
Doug Schifter (February 5, 2018); 7 Danilo Corporan Castillo
(December 20, 2017); 8 and Alfredo Perez (November 2017). 9 For
over a year, the media has put a spotlight on these stories of suicides
by drivers — primarily immigrants themselves — characterizing
drivers’ increasing debt and depression as an epidemic, 10 and adding
immense pressure on local legislators and the Taxi and Limousine
Commission (“TLC”) to take action and impose stringent regulations,
like the temporary, one-year cap it set into motion last August.
To some, the sharing economy is an innovative new world of
possibilities, from a job creation point of view (to be your own boss,
work when and how you want) and a user perspective (order a shared
ride, live like a local during your vacation and forgo the hotel for a

https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/07/nyregion/uber-driver-suicide-for-hire-taxis-newyork.html [https://perma.cc/H49Y-VCA3].
4. Danielle Furfaro, Another Cash-Strapped NYC Cabbie Commits Suicide,
N.Y. POST (July 15, 2018, 5:11 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/06/15/another-cashstrapped-nyc-cabbie-commits-suicide/ [https://perma.cc/S94J-D94D].
5. Nikita Stewart & Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Another Taxi Driver in Debt Takes His
(May
27,
2018),
Life. That’s 5 in 5 Months., N.Y. TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/27/nyregion/taxi-driver-suicide-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/U3VF-2KJN].
6. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, A Taxi Driver Took His Own Life. His Family
N.Y.
TIMES
(May
1,
2018),
Blames
Uber’s
Influence.,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/nyregion/a-taxi-driver-took-his-own-life-hisfamily-blames-ubers-influence.html
[https://perma.cc/C7BE-ZU8N];
Danielle
Furfaro & Max Jaeger, Cabbie Blamed Uber, Lyft for Financial Woes Before
N.Y.
POST
(Mar.
21,
2018,
3:20
PM),
Hanging
Himself,
https://nypost.com/2018/03/21/cabbie-blamed-uber-lyft-for-financial-woes-beforehanging-himself/ [https://perma.cc/9B3Q-H5V5].
7. Jessica Bruder, Driven to Despair, N.Y. MAGAZINE (May 14, 2018),
http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/05/the-tragic-end-to-a-black-car-driverscampaign-against-uber.html [https://perma.cc/PYH6-3CBZ]; see also Doug Schifter,
(Feb.
5,
2018),
FACEBOOK
https://www.facebook.com/permalink.php?story_fbid=1888367364808997&id=100009
072541151 [https://perma.cc/9DBH-M7AV].
8. Dan Rivoli et al., Distraught Livery Driver Killed Himself Weeks Before
Second City Hall Suicide, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 6, 2018, 9:33 PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/distraught-driver-killed-weeks-city-hallsuicide-article-1.3803684 [https://perma.cc/NN2J-XU55].
9. Henry Goldman, Suicides, Traffic Hell in NYC Spur Second Look at Uber’s
BLOOMBERG
(June
18,
2018,
4:00
AM),
Growth,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-06-18/suicides-traffic-hell-in-nyc-spursecond-look-at-uber-s-growth [https://perma.cc/2N4L-UUMS ].
10. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Suicides Get Taxi Drivers Talking: ‘I’m Going to Be
One
of
Them’,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
2,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/02/nyregion/suicides-taxi-drivers-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/Y9G2-7DNT].
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chic apartment). To others, the sharing economy provides the same
services we have always had — just transacted through an app — and
is, therefore, something to control and integrate into the existing
governance and structural systems currently in place (as opposed to
creating new, dynamic laws).
Uber is one of the most polarizing phenomenon in the sharing
economy. Uber’s informal, accessible app-based system of ordering a
private car has rocked the taxi industry from New York to London.
Flipping even the traditional structure of entrepreneurship on its
head, the gig revolution and rideshare industry’s success in New York
City (the “City”) creates extra costs, including slower traffic speeds,
worsening traffic congestion, and increased competition for taxi and
livery drivers (who are heavily regulated and capped by a draconian
“medallion” system 11).
There are two competing interests at play: one, the economic needs
of all professional drivers, taxi, and rideshare alike; and, two, the
problem of race-based refusals that have historically plagued
residents living deep into Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx. More
and more outer borough residents rely heavily upon Uber and other
rideshare companies like it. But now the New York City Council is
attempting to limit the number of rideshare vehicles on the streets of
New York. Called a “ban first, study later” approach by Uber, the
City Council’s new legislation — Introduction No. 144-B (“Int. No.
144-B”) — was passed into law in August 2018, halting the issuance of
for-license vehicles for one year. 12 With New York’s one-year cap
now set to expire in August of this year, the nation’s largest cities are
watching what the mayor, city legislators, and the TLC will do next.
As part of a package of bills intended to strictly regulate app-based
rideshares, relieve congestion, and increase driver pay, the
moratorium — especially if it should become permanent — is
ultimately a non-evidence-based solution that will hurt the lowerincome, minority communities in the outer boroughs of New York
City.

11. Sam Harnett, Cities Made Millions Selling Taxi Medallions, Now Drivers Are
the Price, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Oct. 15, 2018, 4:28 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/10/15/656595597/cities-made-millions-selling-taximedallions-now-drivers-are-paying-the-price [https://perma.cc/WRK4-V89B].
12. See Complaint at 2, Zehn-NY LLC v. City of New York, No. 151730/2019
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2019). See generally N.Y.C. Council, Introduction No. 144-B
(enacted August 14, 2018) [hereinafter Int. No. 144-B]; N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19502(hh) (2019); N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-550 (2019).
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Part I of this Note traverses the transportation landscape, from why
the differences between rideshares and yellow cabs justify varying
regulatory schemes, to patterns of rideshare growth. It also examines
the empirical data supporting the notion that a blanket cap on
rideshares hurts outer-borough communities, low-income residents,
and minorities the most. Part II analyzes the constitutionality of the
new law, exploring ways transit advocates can invoke possible civil
rights arguments against such a regulatory cap. It also acknowledges
the possibility that a law granting authority to the TLC to limit the
number of rideshare vehicle licenses is preempted. Ultimately, this
Part concludes that there are several underlying policy assertions for
why, even if these claims are unsuccessful under federal or state
statutes, neither the City Council nor the TLC should implement a
permanent cap. Finally, Part III proposes alternative ways of
thinking about rideshare regulation, recommendations (like
congestion pricing), and ultimately embraces rideshares as an
innovative transit alternative.
I.

THE NEW YORK CITY TRANSPORTATION LANDSCAPE IN 2018

Part I examines New York City’s new local law capping rideshare
vehicle licenses for one year and the transportation landscape as a
result of the rapid growth of rideshares in the last several years.
Section I.A. looks in particular at Int. No. 144-B and the events
leading to its passage. Section I.B. discusses the differences between
rideshare regulation and the taxi medallion administration. It also
inspects the overlooked bus system, green cabs, and commuter vans.
Section I.C. surveys the empirical data supporting the perspective
that, because demand for rideshares in the outer boroughs in
particular is significant and growing, rideshares are an important
service on which low-income, minority communities rely. Lastly,
Section I.D. considers the effect of rideshares on all five boroughs in
general.
A. New York City’s New Local Laws: Background
On August 8, 2018, the New York City Council (“City Council”)
passed a one-year moratorium on the issuance of new licenses for
rideshare vehicles. This is the first time a major U.S. city has enacted
a law to limit the number of rideshares, 13 also known as “for-hire

13. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit With Cap as New York City Takes Lead in
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
8,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/08/nyregion/uber-vote-city-council-cap.html

Crackdown,
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vehicles” (“FHVs”). 14 The City’s new law is one of the strongest laws
attempting to regulate Uber, Lyft, and other transportation network
companies (“TNCs”) in the country. During this one-year ban, the
City says it will study the effect of for-hire vehicles in the city in order
to evaluate future rideshare regulation and whether to make the cap
on rideshare vehicle issuances permanent. 15 Thirty-nine Council
members voted in favor of the cap, while six voted against it. 16 In

[https://perma.cc/ZN4F-GVFG] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap]. The
new bill does not prohibit the issuance of licenses for wheelchair-accessible vehicles.

Id.

14. In this Note, the term “rideshare” is used to refer to services provided by TNC
companies like Uber and Lyft, but they are also often colloquially called “ride-hails.”
In New York, rideshares are regulated as part of the for-hire industry (and thus, may
also be called for-hire vehicles, or “FHVs”). See infra note 21 and accompanying text.
Furthermore, rideshare companies may, in general, be called a “transportation
network company” (“TNC”), originating from a 2013 California Public Utilities
Commission ruling, which officially defined these services as TNCs. See Tomio
Geron, California Becomes First State to Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft,
Sidecar,
UberX,
FORBES
(Sept.
19,
2013,
3:40
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-toregulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx/#7ec7b7001804
[https://perma.cc/AX8G-E68F].
15. See Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap, supra note 13.
16. The six members who voted against the new law were three Democrats (Inez
nd
th
th
Barron, 42 district; Robert Cornegy, 36 district; and Mark Gjonaj, 13 district)
st
nd
and three Republicans (Joseph Borelli, 51 district; Eric Ulrich, 32 district; and
th
Steven Matteo, 50 district). City Council, City of New York, Transcript of the
Minutes of the Council Stated Meeting 47–51, 56–122 (Aug. 8, 2018) [hereinafter
Transcript of the Minutes]. Explaining his vote, Ulrich said that his borough of
Queens was home to many transportation deserts that “don’t have the luxury . . . of
having multiple subway lines beneath our feet and adequate bus service,” and that
yellow cabs, while “nostalgic,” were,
a declining industry with an outdated business model, and by placing the cap
on new licenses for for-hire vehicles, that would be the equivalent of the
City Council deciding that we’re going to put a cap on Netflix subscription
because we’re worried about Blockbusters that are closing. Technology
changes. Society changes. The economy changes. This is a free market and
we have to be able to move with the market. The fact that we’re now
capping for one year instead of waiting for this study to come back, we’re
also going to be limiting thousands of New Yorkers from bringing in extra
income that they work hard for that they need to sustain themselves and to
support their families.
Id. at 110–11. Similarly, Barron said in her community of Brooklyn,
from the time that I was little many years ago, we did not see yellow cabs
unless we were coming from the airport and you got a yellow taxi to bring
you home. So from that need, the ingenuity and the resourcefulness of
people led to the cabs that you could call. You put in a call, they would
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addition, the new law permitted New York to set a minimum pay rate
for rideshare drivers — also the first in the country. 17 Calling the
growth of app-based, for-hire vehicles a “crisis,” 18 Mayor Bill de
Blasio signed the bill into law, adding that the new laws are part of his
broader efforts to combat income inequality. 19

come and pick you up. And now it has expanded to where we have the app
hails and people get service in that way. This industry that has expanded
has provided a great service, and I think that perhaps if a study had been
done prior to the legislation, we would see what it is in fact we needed to do
to bring some equity to the situation. I think that my community will be
hindered, suffer, and not have services that they need with this.
Id. at 78–79. Finally, Gjonaj remarked that the cap does not adequately consider
rideshare drivers working part-time or as an additional source of income. Id. at 84–85.
17. Id.; see also Peter Holley, New Rules Guarantee Minimum Wage for NYC
Uber,
Lyft
Drivers,
WASH.
POST
BLOGS
(Dec.
4,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/12/04/new-rules-guaranteeminimum-wage-nyc-uber-lyft-drivers/?noredirect=on [https://perma.cc/5KPD-6GPU]
(noting that the new pay floor for rideshare drivers is set at $17.22 per hour to bring
the minimum pay in line with the City’s $15.00 per hour minimum wage for typical
employees — with the extra $2.22 accounting for contract drivers’ payroll taxes and
paid time off). On December 4, 2018, the TLC voted to adopt the minimum pay rate
for app-based drivers, which went into effect on December 31, 2018. Id. Because
rideshare drivers are considered independent contractors rather than employees, they
are not subject to the standard minimum wage laws. Id.; Mallory Locklear, NYC
Passes Minimum Pay Wage for Uber and Lyft Drivers, ENGADGET (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.engadget.com/2018/12/04/nyc-minimum-pay-wage-uber-lyft-drivers/
[https://perma.cc/ANY8-RX8P]. A study by the TLC recommended a $17.22 hourly
minimum wage after expenses to cover paid time off and the costs of owning and
driving a car in the City. James A. Parrott & Michael Reich, An Earnings Standard
for New York City’s App-Based Drivers: Economic Analysis and Policy Assessment,
CTR. N.Y.C. AFFAIRS (July 2018), http://www.centernyc.org/an-earnings-standard
[https://perma.cc/938Y-YLLN]; see Faiz Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes
First-in-the-Nation Cap on Uber and Lyft, WASH. POST BLOGS (Aug. 8. 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2018/08/08/new-york-citycouncil-votes-to-cap-uber-and-lyft/?utm_term=.b7a1dbecab78
[https://perma.cc/S3VD-ND7K] [hereinafter Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes
First-in-the-Nation Cap]. The Independent Drivers Guild reports that app-based
drivers currently earn about $11.90 an hour. NYC Sets Nation’s First Minimum Wage
for App-Based Drivers, INDEP. DRIVERS GUILD (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://drivingguild.org/2018/12/04/nyc-sets-nations-first-minimum-wage-for-appbased-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/Y6AQ-RUWL].
18. Mayor Bill de Blasio (@NYCMayor), TWITTER (Aug. 8, 2018, 1:24 PM),
https://twitter.com/NYCMayor/status/1027289516145557505 [https://perma.cc/AT95PGNM]; see Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes First-in-the-Nation Cap, supra
note 17.
19. Henry Goldman, NYC Is Set to Impose A Cap on Uber, BLOOMBERG (Aug.
6, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-08-06/nyc-set-toimpose-cap-on-uber-as-ride-hail-vehicles-clog-streets [https://perma.cc/L4F7-24VX].
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Four Years in the Making

New York City Council’s initiative to cap Uber began in 2015.20
While Uber started operating in New York City in 2011, by 2015, the
number of FHVs 21 grew by more than 60%, 22 or to over 63,000. 23
About 20,000 of those 63,000 for-hire vehicles were affiliated with
Uber, according to the TLC. 24 At the time, the number of vehicles
associated with Uber were growing at a rate of 3% per month. 25
Mayor de Blasio, citing the worsening Manhattan traffic congestion,
proposed placing “a cap on Uber’s growth, pending a study of traffic
patterns.” 26 Uber launched an aggressive anti-cap ad campaign,
replete with criticism of de Blasio. 27 Before it ever reached a Council

20. See Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio Administration Dropping Plan for Uber
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
22,
2015),
for
Now,
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/nyregion/de-blasio-administration-droppingplan-for-uber-cap-for-now.html [https://perma.cc/SKV3-XL3D]; Issie Lapowsky,
Uber Wins Its Battle Against NYC’s Mayor—For Now, WIRED (July 22, 2015, 5:25
PM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-wins-battle-nyc-mayor-now/
[https://perma.cc/EAP9-NW2D].
21. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-502 (2019). A “for-hire vehicle” is defined as: “a
motor vehicle carrying passengers for hire in the city, with a seating capacity of
twenty passengers or less, not including the driver, other than a taxicab, coach,
wheelchair accessible van, commuter van or an authorized bus operating pursuant to
applicable provisions of law . . . .” Id. Furthermore, as of August 14, 2018, “[h]ighvolume for-hire service” has been added to the Code to mean:

Cap,

[A]n individual, partnership, limited liability company, business
corporation, sole proprietorship . . . operating under, or in affiliation with,
one brand or trade name . . . that offers, facilitates or otherwise connects
passengers to for-hire vehicles by prearrangement, including through one or
more licensed black car bases, luxury limousine bases, or livery base
stations . . . utilizing software that allows a passenger or prospective
passenger to arrange for transportation using a passenger-facing booking
tool, including a smartphone or other electronic device, and that dispatches,
or facilitates the dispatching of, 10,000 or more trips in the city in one
day . . . .

Id.

22. Matt Flegenheimer & Emma G. Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in
Over New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/17/nyregion/city-hall-and-uber-clash-in-struggleover-new-york-streets.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/R665-FSVF].
23. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See Flegenheimer & Fitzsimmons, supra note 22.
27. See Issie Lapowsky, Uber’s New Fake Feature in NYC Derides Regulators,
(July
15,
2015),
https://www.wired.com/2015/07/uber-de-blasio/
WIRED
[https://perma.cc/3PYA-VF3J ]. In July 2015, Uber added the “de Blasio” feature to

Struggle
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vote, de Blasio agreed to drop his plan to cap the number of Uber and
ridesharing vehicles operating in New York City, much to the dismay
of taxi drivers and medallion-holders. 28 Instead, the company and the
City struck an agreement: The City would conduct a four-month
study on the effects of rideshare growth on New York City traffic, and
Uber would be required to “release a trove of data the city had been
seeking for its analysis” 29 of traffic patterns and rideshare growth,
which the company reluctantly shared in exchange for avoiding the
moratorium. 30 The New York City Charter was thereafter amended
to reflect the occurrence of this study. 31 However, City officials
warned a restriction similar to the proposed cap “remained a
possibility down the line.” 32
Uber’s proliferation today, compared to its growth in 2015,
continues to be significant. In 2018, there were 80,000 FHVs in New
York City associated with ride-hailing apps. 33 Approximately 65,000
of those vehicles were affiliated with Uber 34 — making it Uber’s

its app, available only to New York City riders, as part of its ad campaign opposing a
cap. Using this function, the map showed zero available cars — or a car twenty-five
minutes away — followed by the message, “[t]his is what Uber will look like in NYC
if Mayor de Blasio’s Uber cap bill passes.” Id. Coupled with local television
commercials featuring drivers calling on people to oppose the cap, Uber’s ad
campaign further criticized Mayor de Blasio, depicting him “as a protector of the
yellow taxi industry, whose leaders have been significant campaign contributors to
the mayor.” See Flegenheimer, supra note 20; Uber, Integration on Moleskine
Timepage, YOUTUBE (July 15, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/embed/xFOQ6ID6lvk
[https://perma.cc/GY98-BCRE].
28. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20; Lapowsky, supra note 27.
29. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20.
30. Id.
31. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2303.
32. See Flegenheimer, supra note 20.
33. Jeffrey C. Mays, 3 Years Ago, Uber Beat Back a Cap on Vehicles. What’s
N.Y.
TIMES
(Aug.
9,
2018),
Changed?
A
Lot,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/09/nyregion/uber-cap-nyc-decision-strategy.html
[https://perma.cc/FJR5-TZVW]. In New York City, there are a variety of on-demand
rideshare apps connecting users to private for-hire vehicles, including Uber, Lyft,
Via, and Juno. See Kailla Coomes, The Best Ridesharing Apps for 2019, DIGITAL
TRENDS (July 1, 2018), https://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/best-ride-sharing-apps/
[https://perma.cc/F63Y-SBJX]. Alternatively, Gett, Curb, and Arro are app-based
services booking riders with yellow and green cabs and other established taxi
operators. Id.
34. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling. So Are
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
17,
2018),
Uber
Drivers.,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/17/nyregion/uber-taxi-drivers-struggle.html
[https://perma.cc/W6G7-R6R8] [hereinafter Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York
Are Struggling]; see also Paul Berger & Greg Bensinger, New York Plans to Cap
Uber and Lyft, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2018),
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largest market in the United States. 35 Ubers provide more than
400,000 trips a day, while Lyft accounts for 112,000 trips a day.36
Furthermore, it is likely that the number of FHVs operating in New
York City will continue to grow. To date, the TLC has issued a total
of 130,000 licenses to FHVs 37 and since May 2016, an average of 1700
new FHVs “have become active every month.” 38 By contrast, New
York City taxicabs, which are capped at 13,587 licensed drivers, have
expanded in fleet number little since the 1930s and provide 300,00039
trips a day. 40

2.

Attack on Tech for the Sake of . . . Attacking Tech?

The City Council cited a number of factors as justification for the
one-year cap on rideshares and minimum wage floor: increased
protection for drivers (both of rideshares and taxis); 41 mitigation of
traffic congestion in Manhattan’s central business district; regulation
of the otherwise unrestricted growth of the booming rideshare
industry because this growth is unsustainable; 42 and address of the
growing environmental concerns stemming from the rideshare
economy’s rapid proliferation. 43

https://www.wsj.com/articles/new-york-city-council-votes-to-cap-uber-and-lyft1533759263 [https://perma.cc/W6G7-R6R8] (noting that ride-hail vehicles — like
Uber and Lyft — numbered 25,000 in 2015, while in 2018, there were about 80,000).
35. See Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap, supra note 13.
36. See Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are Struggling, supra note 34.
According to experts, if Uber’s drivers were classified as employees rather than
independent contractors, Uber would be New York City’s number one private forprofit employer. See Holley, supra note 17.
37. See generally N.Y.C. Council, Committee on For-Hire Vehicles, PROPOSED
INT.
NO.
144-B,
at
7
(Aug.
8,
2018)
https://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=3331789&GUID=6647E63
0-2992-461F-B3E3-F5103DED0653&Options=&Search= [https://perma.cc/N2UW95ZX] [hereinafter Committee Report 8/8/18]. Note that licenses for vehicles, drivers
themselves, and bases are issued separately. FAQ for TNC Drivers, DEP’T MOTOR
VEHICLES, https://dmv.ny.gov/more-info/faq-tnc-drivers [https://perma.cc/VQ2FTKP5].
38. See Committee Report 8/8/18, supra note 37, at 9.
39. See Holley, supra note 17.
40. NEW YORK CITY TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION, 2017 ANNUAL REPORT 8
(2017).
41. Id.
42. See Goldman, supra note 19; Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes First-inthe-Nation Cap, supra note 17.
43. See Goldman, supra note 19; Siddiqui, New York City Council Passes First-inthe-Nation Cap, supra note 17.
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Many council members acknowledged the serious, legitimate
concern that discrimination and racism has led to communities of
color being denied access to taxis, that transit deserts were indeed a
serious problem that needs addressing, and that rideshares were
indeed filling a gap in transit access. 44 A strong majority nevertheless
voted in favor of the package of bills that included a cap and
minimum wage because it included a broad exemption for
wheelchair-accessible vehicles and would create of the Office of
Inclusion at the TLC to examine discrimination. 45
The City’s exertion of control over rideshare economy sent a
strong message to the tech industry. 46 New York City’s move to curb
the growth of rideshares could inspire other major cities nationwide
to impose similar regulations. 47 The new regulatory strategy is a blow
to Uber, which had a projected valuation of $120 billion in early
2019, 48 and after months of anticipation, went public on May 10, 2019
at the disappointingly low price of $45 per share (valuing the
company at about $75.46 billion). 49 Similarly, it will heavily impact
44. See, e.g., City Council of New York Hearing Transcript 102–04, 110 (Aug. 8,
2018).
45. See Transcript of the Minutes, supra note 16, at 47, 77; William Neuman, New
York Office to Address Discrimination by Taxis and For-Hire Vehicles, N.Y. TIMES
(July 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/nyregion/uber-taxis-minoritiesbias-refusal-nyc.html [https://perma.cc/6T73-AJDP].
46. See generally Transcript of the Minutes, supra note 16. Indeed, many Council
members noted that this bill was intended to send a message to billion-dollar tech
companies. Id. at 98. Richards, who voted yes, said he was “proud to be part of a
body led by Speaker Johnson that is sending a message to billion dollar companies
that have aggressively waged a public campaign against raising standards for their
own drivers and regulations that would reign in the oversaturation of their cars on
our city streets that have added to an ever-growing congestion problem. In New
York City, there should be one set of rules for everyone, and no corporation should
feel that they are entitled to a monopoly at the expense of people’s lives.” Id. at 98.
47. Fitzsimmons, Uber Hit with Cap, supra note 13; see also Owain James, Uber
and Lyft Are Lobbying States to Prohibit Local Regulation, MOBILITYLAB (July 24,
2018),
https://mobilitylab.org/2018/07/24/uber-and-lyft-are-lobbying-states-toprohibit-local-regulation/ [https://perma.cc/YQ75-5ZN5].
48. Liz Hoffman et al., Uber Proposals Value Company at $120 Billion in a
Possible
IPO,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Oct.
16,
2018,
1:28
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-proposals-value-company-at-120-billion-in-apossible-ipo-1539690343 [https://perma.cc/5HJ3-RAZF] (basing the estimated, preIPO valuation off of proposals from Wall Street banks).
49. Andrew J. Hawkins, Uber Goes Public: Everything You Need to Know
About the Biggest Tech IPO in Years, VERGE (May 10, 2019, 12:50 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/10/18564197/uber-ipo-stock-valuation-pricing-faresdrivers-public-market [https://perma.cc/K2WP-XF53]. In its first earnings report since
listing its shares on the stock market, Uber reported losses of more than $1 billion for
the quarter (compared to profit a year ago resulting from divestures), while revenues
rose twenty percent to $3.1 billion, which is “slower than the 25 percent annual
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Lyft, which became the first ridesharing company to go public on
March 29, 2019, and is now valued at $27 billion. 50
But in terms of any practical ramifications for the cap — for
example, mitigating congestion in Manhattan — whether a cap on
rideshares will be actually effective is questionable. 51 Manhattan’s
traffic congestion problems existed long before Uber and Lyft’s
appearance, 52 and as a regulatory strategy meant to decongest traffic,
transportation experts say that citywide cap on for-hire vehicles is
suboptimal with “questionable efficacy.” 53 And, as previously
mentioned, there are alarming externalities, which council members
explicitly acknowledged during the hearing, that should make such a
regulatory strategy unjustified.
Finally, there is uncertainty regarding whether a cap on for-hire
vehicles, provided by private tech companies, is legally justifiable.
Ubers, to put it simply, are not taxis. The services, while comparable,
are not the same, and conflating the two from a regulatory standpoint
has little basis in the law, however little law there is about this
burgeoning industry.
Today, New York City is home to over 8.5 million people and 4.4
million daily commuters in its five boroughs (Manhattan, Brooklyn,
Queens, the Bronx, and Staten Island). 54 The City has welcomed
300,000 residents, 700,000 jobs, and 16 million tourists in the last
decade. 55 Meanwhile, growth, or at least improvement, of transit, has
growth it had recorded in the prior quarter” — which is “the company’s lowest
quarterly growth rate since it began disclosing its results in 2017.” Kate Conger,
Uber’s First Earnings Report After I.P.O.: $1 Billion Loss, N.Y. TIMES (May 30,
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/30/technology/uber-stock-earnings.html
2019),
[https://perma.cc/KF9T-BGNG].
50. Kate Conger & Michael J. de la Merced, Lyft’s Shares Jump in Trading
Debut, Cementing Rise of the Gig Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/technology/lyft-stock-price.html
[https://perma.cc/VP5Y-W6AU].
51. See NICK SIFUENTES & LIAM BLANK, HIRE CONGESTION, LOWER SPEEDS: IS IT
TIME TO CAP FOR-HIRE VEHICLES? 4 (2018), http://www.tstc.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/06/Hire-Congestion.pdf
[https://perma.cc/E8PH-AV83]
[hereinafter HIRE CONGESTION] (“An overly-aggressive citywide cap on FHVs would
not only reduce availability in lower-income communities; it would potentially
depress revenues from the congestion surcharge as well, thereby impacting funding
for transit.”).
52. Id. at 5.
53. Id. at 4, 6.
54. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, THE OTHER
TRANSIT CRISIS: HOW TO IMPROVE THE NYC BUS SYSTEM 9 (2017),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/reports/the-other-transit-crisis-how-to-improve-the-nycbus-system/ [https://perma.cc/ABJ9-CQF7].
55. Id.
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been less than proportional to the increase of people relying on
transportation. Of the various ways people — inhabitants and
tourists alike — traverse around the City, buses are not reaching their
maximum potential 56 and subways are increasingly failing. 57 In their
places, Uber has filled the gap for many residents. 58

3.

Uber’s Response to the City’s One-Year Ban

On February 25, 2019, Uber filed a lawsuit against the City of New
York. Their complaint alleges, among other things, that Int. No. 144B, in delegating to the TLC permanent FHV capping power, exceeds
the City Council’s power, was imposed without first studying what
effect FHVs have on congestion, and is ultimately preempted by
other interconnected regulatory measures put forth by the State of
New York in 2018. 59
According to City Clerk records, Uber, Lyft, and other rideshare
companies reportedly spent over $1 million lobbying the de Blasio
administration to scale back rideshare regulations between January
and June 2018 — 70% more than what they spent lobbying the city in
2017 alone. 60 Their recent efforts fighting the temporary moratorium
may not have been a success, especially in comparison to their fierce,
successful challenge of the same cap back in 2015. But these
companies are certainly not done putting up a fight, and their
concern‚ however self-interested, does shine a light on the fact that a
cap as a regulatory strategy is problematic.
Uber may be a private company concerned with protecting their
bottom line. But as earnest critics of the one-year cap, they —
alongside transit and civil rights advocates — argue that the
communities that will be hit the hardest by a cap on rideshare vehicles
are those in the outer boroughs of New York City, which tend to be
low-income, minority communities. 61 Certainly, research shows that

56. Id.
57. Emma G. Fitzsimmons, They Vowed to Fix the Subway a Year Ago. On-Time
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
23,
2018),
Rates
Are
Still
Terrible.,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/23/nyregion/nyc-subway-delays-failure.html
[https://perma.cc/93L9-JC65].
58. See infra Section I.C.3.
59. See generally Complaint, Zehn-NY LLC v. City of New York, No.
151730/2019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 15, 2019).
60. Anna Sanders, Ride-Sharing Companies Spent over $1M Lobbying in NYC,
N.Y. POST (Aug. 4, 2018, 5:35 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/08/04/ride-sharingcompanies-spent-over-1m-lobbying-in-nyc/ [https://perma.cc/JR68-7PPW].
61. Id.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

955

rideshares serve a higher proportion of low-income neighborhoods
than yellow cabs. 62
Residents in the outer boroughs (areas that tend to be considered
“transit deserts”) 63 lack accessible public transit options, endure poor
bus service that is infrequent and overcrowded, 64 and are underserved
by traditional taxi services 65 — despite the City’s attempts to remedy
this underservice by implementing green taxis in 2015. Uber
considers their service a remedy to this ongoing problem. An Uber
ride may not be a commuter’s first choice, but sometimes it may be
their only option when the bus does not show up or subway service is
down.
B.

Regulating Rideshares Alongside the Taxi Medallion Regime

1.

Aren’t Ubers Just Taxis?

For-hire vehicles, such as Ubers, Lyfts, and the like, are currently
subject to a different set of regulations than yellow taxis due to a few
crucial differences. 66 Mainly, yellow taxis have been regulated by a
medallion regime since the 1930s, which gives them a monopoly over
picking up passengers from street hailing. 67 But because yellow taxis
are the only vehicles permitted to pick up street-hail passengers, they
are subject to more stringent regulation as opposed to FHVs, which
may only serve customers who have made a phone call, or called for
the car via a smartphone app (which, in the latter case, would also
require them to have a credit card, and share specific information like
pick-up and drop-off locations). 68
In justifying the distinction between medallion taxicabs from
FHVs, the Second Circuit noted that the different circumstances by
62. See generally HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51.
63. See infra Section I.C.
64. Amy Yensi, Soundview Residents Say Bronx Neighborhood Is Transit Desert,
NY1
(Sept.
9,
2018,
5:25
PM),
https://www.ny1.com/nyc/bronx/news/2018/09/09/soundview-residents-say-bronxneighborhood-is-transit-desert- [https://perma.cc/W44L-WDTL]. Bus rider Sharon
Nelson commented, “If you’re waiting a long time that throws you off for the
connecting bus. I check the transit app and if it’s too long, I take an Uber. I don’t
always want to have to take an Uber. Thank God it’s here right now.” Id.
65. Shoshana Wodinsky, In Major Defeat for Uber and Lyft, New York City
Votes to Limit Ride-Hailing Cars, VERGE (Aug. 8, 2018, 4:39 PM),
https://www.theverge.com/2018/8/8/17661374/uber-lyft-nyc-cap-vote-city-council-newyork-taxi [https://perma.cc/57WU-7WPE].
66. See Committee Report 8/8/18, supra note 37, at 4.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 6.
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which these services obtain riders have resulted in certain regulations
on medallion taxicabs by the TLC that are not appropriate for FHVs:
[Taxis have] . . . vehicle attributes, such as a distinctive yellow color,
overhead lights, air conditioning, and a uniform rate structure.
These regulations conceivably promote safety, convenience, easy
identification, comfort, and uniformity of service for customers who
hail a taxicab on the street and have had no prior dealings with the
driver or the taxicab company. Moreover, other regulations, such as
the requirement of a partition between a driver and a passenger or
an emergency warning light, may promote driver safety when
picking up customers who have no prior relationship with the
taxicab company. 69

Furthermore, taxis are frequently understood to be part of the
“common carrier system,” 70 and thus subject to limited entry, rate
regulation, and universal service obligations. 71 Uber may have
hastened the demise of the taxi industry by upending the financial
security that a taxi medallion provided, 72 but the business of driving a
taxi was strained even before the growth and proliferation of FHVs
by way of its strict regulation and uncompromising numerical cap.
Although New York City first issued taxi medallions in 1937, it took
nearly sixty years before New York started to release any new
medallions. 73 In 1996, the City held the first auction for 1800 new
medallions. 74 The most recent medallion auction was held in 2014;

69. Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 50 (2d Cir. 2018)
(upholding the “TLC’s decision to impose increased accessibility fleet requirements
on medallion taxicabs and not also on FHVs [because it] rationally serves the City’s
legitimate object of making it easier for disabled persons to obtain transportation via
street hail”).
70. James B. Speta, Southwest Airlines, MCI, and Now Uber: Lessons for
Managing Competitive Entry into Taxi Markets, 43 TRANSP. L.J. 101, 114 (2016)
(noting that according to the Supreme Court, a taxi’s “status as a common carrier
depends on how they operate; if taxicabs serve the public generally, they were
considered common carriers”) (citing Terminal Taxicab Co. v. Kutz, 241 U.S. 252,
255–56 (1916)).
71. Id.
72. Winnie Hu, Taxi Medallions, Once a Safe Investment, Now Drag Owners Into
Debt,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
10,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/10/nyregion/new-york-taxi-medallions-uber.html
[https://perma.cc/MSS6-DGN9] (“Taxi ownership once seemed a guaranteed route to
financial security, something that was more tangible and reliable than the stock
market since people hailed cabs in good times and bad.”).
73. Jeff Horwitz & Chris Cumming, Taken for a Ride, SLATE: MONEYBOX (June
6, 2012, 6:30 AM), https://slate.com/business/2012/06/taxi-medallions-how-new-yorksterrible-taxi-system-makes-fares-higher-and-drivers-poorer.html
[https://perma.cc/22EG-P4XQ].
74. See Hu, supra note 72.
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350 new medallions were sold, generating $359 million in revenue.75
Today, by law, there are a total of 13,587 taxi medallions. 76
There are positive aspects to having a medallion system for taxis, in
that the numerical cap, in theory, regulates the proportion of cabs per
people and it may provide equity to taxi owners. 77 However, these
stringent regulations have created a crisis for the medallion regime, in
that it is financially incompatible with rideshare competition for its
drivers. In 1979, taxi drivers also became “independent contractors”
under federal labor laws when the TLC modified its rules to allow
medallions to be leased out for twelve-hour shifts. 78 The need to
make daily lease payments to operate a medallion chipped away at
the economic value of driving a taxi, and this business model
continues in full force today. 79 For example, in 2012, less than 20% of
taxis were owner-operated, meaning taxi fleets or brokers who rent
taxis out to drivers own the majority of medallions. 80
The rise of FHVs has caused a massive plummet in the value of taxi
medallions and placed significant economic strain on one of New
York City’s largest working-class populations. 81 While the medallion
used to steadily rise in value, after reaching a record-high price of $1.3
million in 2014, medallions are now selling for a fraction of that price
(falling to around $160,000). 82 In fact, because of the rise of FHVs,
many medallions are worth far less than what their owners borrowed
to buy them. 83 Taxi cab owners, struggling to pay back the loans they
took out to purchase their medallion, no longer have what was once
considered a guaranteed “retirement fund.” 84 Between 2015 to 2017,
eighty-five medallions were sold as part of foreclosure proceedings,
according to city records. 85

75. Id.
76. See Get a Vehicle License, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/tlc/vehicles/get-a-vehicle-license.page
[https://perma.cc/8W92-XMQZ]; Fitzsimmons, Taxi Drivers in New York Are
Struggling, supra note 34.
77. See Harnett, supra note 11.
78. See id.; Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 73.
79. See Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 73 (commenting that rising gas prices or
traffic jams could deeply impact a driver’s daily wage since they still had to break
even and afford the daily lease payment).
80. See Harnett, supra note 11; id.
81. See Harnett, supra note 11.
82. Id.
83. See Horwitz & Cumming, supra note 73.
84. Id.
85. Id. In August 2017 alone, twelve of the twenty-one medallions sold were done
so as part of foreclosure, with sales prices ranging from $150,000 to $450,000. Id.
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What Are Green Taxis?

The green taxi business, a relatively new player itself to the City’s
transportation landscape, has likewise been impacted by FHVs before
it ever had the chance to take off. 86 Green cabs were implemented in
2013 — just around the time FHVs began picking up speed and when
the value of a medallion reached a high of over $1 million. 87 Mayor
Michael Bloomberg originally devised the plan (the “HAIL Plan”) in
2011 88 to create a new fleet of so-called borough taxis to “bring safe,
reliable taxi service to the 4½ boroughs that don’t currently have it.”89
At the time, a survey conducted by the taxi commission revealed that
95% of yellow taxis picked up passengers below 96th Street in
Green taxis were to be
Manhattan and at the airports. 90
geographically restricted to above East 96th and West 110th streets in
Manhattan, and the outer boroughs (except for two airports in
Queens: LaGuardia and JFK) — areas that are traditionally
underserved by yellow cabs.
Today, there are an estimated 3500 green taxis on the road in New
York City. 91 While green taxis were theoretically intended to operate
as yellow taxis do, in reality, their geographical restrictions have

86. James Barron, Where Yellow Cabs Didn’t Go, Green Cabs Were Supposed to
Then
Came
Uber.,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
3,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/03/nyregion/green-cabs-yellow-uber.html
[https://perma.cc/3XTL-VJ59].
87. Katrina M. Wyman, Taxi Regulation in the Age of Uber, 20 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS.
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 78–79; see Ted Mann, Mayor’s Taxi Plan Gets Green Light; Appeals
Court Upholds Plan to Allow New Street-Hail Livery Cabs, WALL ST. J. (June 7,
2013,
8:50
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324798904578529600046666448
[https://perma.cc/Y4SU-7945].
88. Dana Rubinstein, Bloomberg’s Radical Proposal to Solve New York City’s
Taxi
Problem,
Stalled,
POLITICO
(Oct.
5,
2011,
11:07
AM),
https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2011/10/bloombergs-radicalproposal-to-solve-new-york-citys-taxi-problem-stalled-000222
[https://perma.cc/4ZQG-R86Z]. After the HAIL Plan was passed by legislative
initiative in Albany, thereby bypassing City Council, the District Court ruled it
unconstitutional as a violation of New York’s Home Rule provision and New York’s
State Constitution. Taxicab Serv. Ass’n v. State, No. 102553-2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 21, 2012), rev’d in part by Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 21 N.Y.3d 289 (N.Y.
2013). In 2013, the HAIL Plan was ultimately upheld by the New York Court of
Appeals. See generally Greater N.Y. Taxi Ass’n v. State, 993 N.E.2d 393 (N.Y.
2013).
89. See Mann, supra note 87.
90. See Barron, supra note 86.
91. See id. The New York Times reported this estimate from City officials on
September 3, 2018. Id.

Thrive.

2019]

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

959

stymied their behavior. 92 According to Mitchell L. Moss, director of
the Rudin Center for Transportation Policy and Management at New
York University, green taxis are more likely to find passengers by
waiting at retail hubs, transit hubs, or areas where subway lines end,
rather “than if they cruise the streets they are authorized to cruise
where people are not used to seeing cabs.” 93 Furthermore, Moss
notes that “[t]he benefit of Uber is it can come pick you up in highly
dispersed locations, which the green taxi can’t really do because it’s
got to stay near dense transit pickup locations.” 94
Because many green taxi operators also drive for Uber, the
rideshare company contends they help green taxi drivers by
connecting them with riders. 95 More than 50,000 trips to green taxis
are dispatched from Uber every month. 96 This dispatch connection is
particularly advantageous for riders in distant neighborhoods, since
green taxis can be more difficult to hail from the street than from an
app. However, seeing an apple green-colored borough taxi pull up,
rather than the expected personal vehicle, can be confusing to users. 97
Nevertheless, because green taxis are geographically restricted, they
have a difficult time competing with app-based FHVs. Green taxis
are especially at a disadvantage compared to yellow taxis and FHVs
at airports, where they are allowed to drop off passengers but cannot
pick them up unless the pick-up is prearranged (sent by a dispatcher).
Thus, because of these restrictions, the green taxi must “go to the
airports empty if they are dispatched for a pickup or return empty if
they take someone there.” 98
C.

1.

Rideshares Embrace, Rather than Overlook, the Outer
Boroughs

Rideshares (By the Numbers): More Popular than Taxis in Outer
Boroughs

There is a significant, growing demand for rideshares in the outer
boroughs. Rideshare services have been more popular in the outer

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. Yellow cabs, on the other hand, can wait in taxi lines, while FHVs are not
restricted from picking up passengers at airports. Id.
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boroughs than yellow taxis since 2016. 99 Today, half of all Uber rides
start outside Manhattan — up from one‐fourth just two years ago —
and this number does not include pickups at the City’s two airports in
Queens. 100
In 2015, FiveThirtyEight conducted a study analyzing pickup data
from nearly 19 million Uber rides in New York City from April to
September 2014 and January to June 2015. 101 It found that “Uber has
not caused a net increase in pickups, at least not in Manhattan . . . .
Instead, the ride-share service is replacing cabs in the center of the
city and supplementing them in the outer boroughs.” 102 The study
concluded that in central Manhattan, where green taxis (aka borough
taxis) are not allowed to make pick-ups,
Uber added 3.82 million trips in April through June of
[2015] . . . compared with the same period [in 2014] . . . . Taxis, in the
same area, lost 3.83 million pickups. The total number of pickups
was virtually unchanged: 39.37 million in 2014 versus 39.36 million in
2015. 103

In 2017, Uber, after years of being notoriously withholding about
its data, released ridership data to the New York Times taken from
fifty sample residential areas in the Bronx, Brooklyn, Queens, and on
Staten Island (areas that were known to have limited access to public
transportation). 104 This data revealed that ridership in the outer
boroughs significantly rose from the year before. In August 2017, for
example, Uber made a total of 167,194 weekly pickups in these areas,
compared to the 56,721 weekly pickups it made as of August 2016.105

99. Todd W. Schneider, Analyzing 1.1 Billion NYC Taxi and Uber Trips, with a
Vengeance (Mar. 2018), http://toddwschneider.com/posts/analyzing-1-1-billion-nyc-

taxi-and-uber-trips-with-a-vengeance/ [https://perma.cc/ZS2L-PGFY] (aggregating
data from ride-hail apps Uber, Lyft, and Via, compared to yellow and green taxis).
100. Winnie Hu, Uber, Surging Outside Manhattan, Tops Taxis in New York City,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/nyregion/uber-taxisnew-york-city.html [https://perma.cc/AYY6-U3X6] [hereinafter Hu, Uber Surging].
101. Reuben Fischer-Baum & Carl Bialik, Uber Is Taking Millions of Manhattan
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT
(Oct.
13,
2015),
Rides
Away
from
Taxis,
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/uber-is-taking-millions-of-manhattan-rides-awayfrom-taxis/ [https://perma.cc/6MRD-U9C8]; see also Schneider, supra note 99.
102. Fischer-Baum & Bialik, supra note 101.
103. Id.
104. See Hu, Uber Surging, supra note 100.
105. Id. (“In St. Albans, [Queens,] weekly pickups rose to 6,370 from 1,870 the
year before, . . . . In the Flatlands neighborhood in Brooklyn, which has no subway
station, there were 13,380 weekly pickups, or nearly four times the 3,598 pickups the
previous year. In Starrett City, a vast housing development, weekly pickups rose to
2,261 from 699. Nine areas were on Staten Island, a borough where public transit is
sparse . . . . In the New Springville area, weekly pickups soared to 1,494 from 591.”).
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The study drew more than half of the fifty sample residential areas
from Queens alone, 106 where access to public transportation is sparse
and commutes into Manhattan by bus or subway are long. 107
Indeed, rideshares are outperforming taxicabs in New York City.
As of October 2017, more passengers are choosing ride-hail apps over
yellow taxis. 108 Analyzing TLC datasets of over 1.1 billion individual
taxi trips between January 2009 and June 2015, Todd W. Schneider
reported that “February 2017 marked the first month that ride-hailing
services collectively made more trips than yellow and green taxis
combined, and by December 2017, ride-hailing services made 65%
more pickups than taxis did.” 109 Schneider concluded that the ridehail sector “now makes more pickups per month than taxis did in any
month since the dataset began [in] 2009.” 110 In addition, according to
City data, yellow taxis made an average of 277,042 daily trips in July
2017 (collecting $4 million in fares per day), as compared to 332,231
daily trips (and $4.9 million in fares) the year before. 111 Data
indicates FHV use is increasing while taxi trips are declining,
suggesting that FHVs have created new demand for backseat rides in
Manhattan. 112 Not only are rideshare passengers choosing FHVs
over yellow taxis, but FHVs are also replacing other modes of transit.
Without FHVs, approximately 49% to 61% of ride-hailing trips would
not have been made at all, or made by walking, biking, or transit.113

106. See id.
107. See Eric Jaffe, Where the New York City Subway Doesn’t Go, CITYLAB
(Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2015/08/where-the-new-yorkcity-subway-doesnt-go/400538/ [https://perma.cc/98BJ-LHLE].
108. See Hu, Uber Surging, supra note 100.
109. Schneider, supra note 99.
110. Id.
111. Hu, supra note 72.
112. See Laura Bliss, How to Fix New York City’s ‘Unsustainable’ Traffic Woes,
CITYLAB (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2017/12/how-to-fix[https://perma.cc/86HL-UX53]
new-york-citys-unsustainable-traffic-woes/548798/
(“Total passenger trips increased 15 percent, even as taxi trips declined, in that time
period. That means TNCs [transportation network companies] have created new
demand for backseat rides in Manhattan. And they increased the amount of miles
traveled by for-hire vehicles around by a whopping 36 percent, over the same time
period. That adds up to more than 600 million miles of motor vehicle traffic in the
past 3 years alone — reflecting not only the staggering growth in rides, but a trend
toward lengthier trips and more ‘deadheading,’ or cars traveling without
passengers.”).
113. See REGINA R. CLEWLOW & GOURI SHANKAR MISHRA, DISRUPTIVE
TRANSPORTATION: THE ADOPTION, UTILIZATION, AND IMPACTS OF RIDE-HAILING IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
8
(2017),
https://its.ucdavis.edu/research/publications/?frame=https%3A%2F%2Fitspubs.ucdavi
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Additionally, 50% of for-hire vehicle users surveyed in the City’s
Mobility Report said they had substituted a mass transit journey with
a trip in a FHV. 114 Importantly, FHVs have become so successful in
part due to the decline in subway and bus service: “[T]he Mobility
Report shows that subway ridership fell by just under one percent in
2017, while bus ridership continued its decline from 697 million rides
in 2010 to 638 million today.” 115 Thus, because riders would otherwise
use subways or buses, improving public transit would significantly
help reduce congestion. 116

2.

How TNCs Compare to SHLs and Taxis

The Tri-State Transportation Campaign recently conducted a study
using publicly-available data from the TLC. 117 The data, which
reflects pick-ups and drop-offs from July through December 2017,
constitutes the most recently available data and includes information
for street-hail liveries (“SHLs,” more commonly known as green taxis
or borough taxis), yellow taxis and FHVs. 118 Before mid-2017, TNCs
Aggregating hundreds
were not required to report this data. 119
of thousands of individual pick-ups and drop-offs by FHVs, SHLs,
and yellow taxis, the study cross-references geo-tagged taxi data with
the Census districts to analyze the income level of the neighborhood
where a given pick-up or drop-off occurred. 120 The original purpose
of the study was to assess the viability of a cap on FHVs in New York
City by analyzing rider data to determine whether FHVs like Uber
and Lyft make more pick-ups and drop-offs in congested areas of
Manhattan than yellow or green taxis. 121 While the study does
conclude that FHVs tended to accumulate in dense, congested parts
of Manhattan, it also reveals an interesting trend: The service patterns
of FHVs more closely resemble those of green taxis, as opposed to
yellow taxis, in that they serve low-income communities that are

s.edu%2Findex.php%2Fresearch%2Fpublications%2Fpublicationdetail%2F%3Fpub_id%3D2752 [https://perma.cc/PKM6-CPZ7].
114. HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 5.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See generally id.
118. Id. at 7.
119. Id.
120. Id. (explaining that researchers “broke census tracts apart as they intersected
taxi zones, dividing up the people in each income category based on the percentage
overlap, and then re-aggregated these by taxi zones. The end result is an
approximate sixteen-category income breakdown per taxi zone.”).
121. Id. at 4.
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poorly-served by yellow taxis. 122 While green taxis and FHVs tend to
serve a more widely-distributed area, yellow taxis, as a result of their
artificial cap, tend to operate with relative frequency in higherincome areas of New York, particularly in Manhattan below 96th
Street. 123
The disparity in service between yellow taxis and FHVs becomes
even more striking when the data is broken down into narrower
income categories. 124 Over 25% of yellow taxis’ pick-ups and dropoffs come from neighborhoods with average incomes above $200,000,
compared to 15% of the customer base for FHVs, and 10% of the
customer base for SHLs. 125 As a result of FHVs’ widespread service
into territories occupied by green cabs, green taxi drivers are likewise
suffering economically from Uber’s growth. 126 Not only are the
number of active green taxis on the decline, 127 but green taxi drivers
are working fewer hours than they used to, 128 making fewer trips than
they were in previous years, and are generating less daily revenue
overall. 129 For example, in May 2018, green taxis made 25,693 trips a
day across the entire city, a 55% decrease from May 2015 (the busiest
month on record), which accounted for 57,637 trips. 130 Uber, on the
other hand, accounted for over 84,000 trips in one month to or from a

122. Id. at 7 (“TNCs [transportation network companies] . . . draw 36% of their
customer base from neighborhoods with an average income below $45,000. By
contrast, yellow cabs only draw 26% of their customer base from those same
neighborhoods. At the other end of the income scale, TNCs serve barely more
passengers in neighborhoods with high average incomes: 37%. Yellow cabs, however,
draw over half of their customer base from those high-income neighborhoods.”).
123. Id. at 6.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id. (“The inflection point where the proportion of trips switches is around
$99,999. Below that threshold, SHLs and TNCs derive a larger share of their
customers from those income levels than yellow cabs. Above $100,000, the reverse is
true.”).
126. See generally supra Section I.B.2. As previously mentioned, green taxis (also
known as borough taxis or street-hail liveries (“SHLs”)) can pick up above East 96th
Street, West 110th Street, and in the outer boroughs.
127. See Barron, supra note 86 (stating that only 3514 permits are considered
active by the taxi commission, even though 8345 have been issued since 2013).
128. Id. (finding that green cab drivers’ working hours declined from 6.5 hours in
May 2015 to 5.7 hours in May 2018).
129. Id. Fewer trips and decreased hours spent working has created less revenue
for the green taxi sector, from $862,099 a day citywide in May 2015 to $386,965 a day
citywide in May 2018. Id.
130. Id. According to the taxi commission, a third of green cabs’ service between
January and May 2018 stemmed from pick-ups in Brooklyn; about 31% came from
northern Manhattan; 29.5% were in Queens; only 5.3% were in the Bronx; and only
1/100th of 1% on Staten Island. Id.
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single neighborhood (East New York, Brooklyn) during Summer
2018. 131
While FHVs also skew towards higher income levels, and SHLs
serve a higher proportion of low-income neighborhoods than either
FHVs or yellow cabs, the disparity between FHVs and SHLs is much
narrower than between FHVs and yellow cabs. 132 The report
attributes the similarity in service patterns between FHVs and SHLs
— and, therefore, the benefit to lower-income riders — to their
licensing model. 133 Unlike yellow taxis, which operate under a strict
medallion regime that caps their numbers, FHVs and green taxis do
not have an “over-inflated” cost of entry. 134 In recent years, as
previously mentioned, the yellow taxi economy has become depressed
due to the influx of marketplace competition like Uber. As this study
reveals, subjecting rideshares to an artificial cap will impact service to
lower-income customers — who proportionately tend to live in
boroughs further from Manhattan, 135 in communities that are made
up predominantly of minorities 136 — not to mention disabled

131. Id.
132. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 8.
133. Id. at 8.
134. Id.; see also Speta, supra note 70, at 114. The regulation of taxi cabs as
“common carriers” can be justified in terms of market failures:
Average rate regulation, especially if based on distance or a combination of
distance and time for the trip, creates another problem: not all trips of the
same distance or time are of equal value. This is because some trips will
result in deadheading—an ‘empty’ return trip—and thus any trip has two
values, the value of the trip itself and the odds that a deadhead will result.
Given this variation, cabs, even when subject to average rate regulation, will
compete for trips that are less likely to result in empty returns and may
simply refuse trips that are highly likely to result in empty returns. In
practical terms, this means that cabs will congregate in downtown areas and
may refuse to travel to less dense or poorer areas. It is not surprising
therefore that one regulation that has generally accompanied taxi regulation
is the requirement to haul all customers. This is the duty to serve of
common carrier regulation.
Speta, supra note 70, at 114.
135. See generally HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51.
136. Richard A. Marcantonio et al., Confronting Inequality in Metropolitan

Regions: Realizing the Promise of Civil Rights and Environmental Justice in
Metropolitan Transportation Planning, 44 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1017, 1019 (2017)

(“Continuing disparities manifest themselves in astonishingly high income and wealth
inequality between whites and people of color, especially African Americans and
Latinos.”); see also id. at 1022 (“Twentieth century metropolitan growth in the
United States resulted in regions nominally linked by transportation infrastructure
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riders. 137 The effects of this uneven access to rideshare transportation
may be far-reaching for major urban cities like New York, given the
link between transportation access with “employment outcomes and
other opportunities, especially in communities of color.” 138 Because
yellow taxis “disproportionately serve higher-income communities”139
as a result of their cap, maintaining accessible, affordable TNC and
green taxi service in the outer boroughs is essential. Ultimately, the
study concluded that an artificial cap on FHVs would not accomplish
as much decongestion as the City Council might hope. 140
Similar patterns have emerged in other large U.S. cities like San
Francisco, Chicago, and Houston, where demand for rideshares tends
to concentrate in downtown or central business district parts of the
city, spreading outwardly to outlying neighborhoods and suburbs. 141
A similar phenomenon is also occurring in Los Angeles, 142 a city with
a dense population like New York, albeit one that is massively
interconnected by highways: Lyft drivers serve 99.8% of the
population of L.A. County. 143 While rideshare users in Los Angeles
live disproportionately in high-income neighborhoods relative to the

and shared housing and labor markets, but separated by vast differences in racial
composition, wealth, crime, health outcomes, and access to opportunities like quality
education and employment. These disparities often map consistently onto patterns of
racial segregation.”).
137. Molly Taft, Why Can’t Uber and Lyft Be More Wheelchair-Friendly?,
CITYLAB (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/12/ride[https://perma.cc/8J65hailing-users-disabilitiies-wheelchair-access-uber/577855/
3HE4].
138. Marcantonio, supra note 136, at 1019–20 (“Although race and class residential
segregation diminished somewhat in the late 1980s, differential access to
opportunities remains a significant problem today. Transportation is both a key
driver of these continued problems and a sector on which billions of dollars of
federal, state, regional, and local funds are spent every year.
Although
transportation infrastructure is but a single component of a mix of factors at play,
there is overwhelming evidence linking transportation with employment outcomes
and other opportunities, especially in communities of color.”).
139. HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 4.
140. See id. at 5.
141. See Hu, Uber Surging, supra note 100.
142. See Anne Elizabeth Brown, Ridehail Revolution: Ridehail Travel and Equity
in Los Angeles (Jan. 1, 2018) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, UCLA) (on file with
UCLA Electronic Theses and Dissertations); see also Laura Bliss, Lyft Is Reaching
L.A. Neighborhoods Where Taxis Wouldn’t, CITYLAB (June 29, 2018),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/06/lyft-is-reaching-la-neighborhoodswhere-taxis-wouldnt/563810/ [https://perma.cc/367Z-SPRG]; David Z. Morris, Ride-

Hailing Apps May Benefit Poor and Minority Communities the Most, Study
Suggests, FORTUNE (June 30, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/30/uber-lyft-poorminority-communities/ [https://perma.cc/7JLF-X6W2].
143. Brown, supra note 142, at 134.
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broader population, 144 users living in low-income areas made more
Lyft trips per person in comparison to middle- and high-income
communities. 145

3.

Transit Inequity in the Outer Boroughs

Significant reliance and ridership from the outer boroughs are
attributable to a variety of factors. First, outer boroughs tend to offer
poorer, more limited access to transportation. 146 New York City has
472 stations connecting 122 of the City’s 189 neighborhoods, but only
75% of the population (6.3 million New Yorkers out of a population
of over 8 million) has access to a subway within their
neighborhood. 147 Transit deserts, or areas that are further than a tenminute walk from the subway, 148 are common in outer borough areas
like Queens, the Bronx, and Southeast Brooklyn. 149 For instance,
while 50% of FHV users citywide indicated that ride-hail service
replaced a transit trip, a staggering 68% of riders in Northern
Manhattan and Northern Bronx reported using ride-hail services to
replace transit trips. 150 Additionally, in Southern Bronx, Northern
Bronx, and Staten Island, over 68% of people said that ride-hail
services replaced local bus trips. 151
“[B]ootstraps capitalists” have been filling the transportation voids
in transit deserts by providing commuter vans, aka “jitney” or “dollar
vans,” 152 since the mid-80s. 153 Known as the “shadow transportation

144. Id.; see also CLEWLOW & MISHRA, supra note 113, at 7 (citing Aaron Smith,
Shared, Collaborative and On Demand: The New Digital Economy, PEW RESEARCH

CENTER (May 19, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/05/19/the-new-digitaleconomy/ [https://perma.cc/L8BL-3Y5R]).
145. Brown, supra note 142, at 134. Ultimately, a rider’s greater use of Lyft
depended not on income, but whether they owned a personal car. Id.
146. See Jaffe, supra note 107.
147. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, SERVICE
DENIED: ACCESSIBILITY AND THE NEW YORK CITY SUBWAY SYSTEM 1 (2018),
https://comptroller.nyc.gov/wpcontent/uploads/documents/Service_Denied_072018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QE7VSR53] [hereinafter SERVICE DENIED].
148. See Jaffe, supra note 107.
149. See Thomas J. Campanella, Opinion, Watering New York’s Transit Deserts,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/13/opinion/mta-newyork-transit-deserts.html [https://perma.cc/3RKF-U8MR].
150. N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., NEW YORK CITY MOBILITY REPORT 26 (2018),
http://www.nyc.gov/html/dot/downloads/pdf/mobility-report-2018-print.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3LEA-V72X].
151. Id.
152. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal
Transportation and the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 176 (2001). The name
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system,” 154 dollar vans and other shuttles operate heavily in the areas
identified as transit deserts, or areas that are underserved by buses
and subways. 155 Over 100,000 riders a day rely on these unofficial
shuttles. 156 Today, much of the informal culture of dollar vans is a
vestige of its tenacious, utilitarian roots: typically, there are no
timetables or service maps, or even official stops or stations. 157 In
fact, most riders hear about this shadow network through word of
mouth, or by chancing upon the vans in the street. New Yorkers
living in outer boroughs are heavily reliant on this informal bus
system, touted as an efficient way to supplement mass transit with
privately-owned transit entrepreneurs 158 and as providing not only an
alternative source of transportation, but job creation.
Many areas in the outer boroughs may also be classified as “transit
deserts” because they do not provide access to the subways for
disabled or elderly residents. Over half of the neighborhoods (sixtytwo out of 122) served by subways are inaccessible under Americans
with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) standards. 159 Neighborhoods without

“dollar vans” is a nod to the early days when a ride cost $1.00. See Annie Correal,
Inside
the
Dollar
Van
Wars,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
8,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/08/nyregion/inside-the-dollar-van-wars.html
[https://perma.cc/5NYU-36Q9].
153. The history of New York City’s dollar vans is rooted in a 1980 transit strike,
which halted subway trains and bus transportation throughout the five boroughs. See
Aaron Reiss, New York’s Shadow Transit, NEW YORKER (Apr. 4, 2019),
[https://perma.cc/YXN3https://projects.newyorker.com/story/nyc-dollar-vans/
9D5U]. Residents in these transit deserts crowdsourced together and began using
their own vehicles to transport people to their destinations, charging a dollar for the
service. Id. The strike ended eleven days later, but what started as an ad hoc
community transportation system carried on. Id. Even though subways and buses
resumed, there was still “huge demand in neighborhoods that weren’t well served by
public transit even when buses and trains were running.” See also Garnett, supra note
152, at 203–04; Lisa Margonelli, The (Illegal) Private Bus System that Works,
ATLANTIC (Oct. 5, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/10/theillegal-private-bus-system-that-works/246166/ [https://perma.cc/L5VZ-SLY5].
154. See Reiss, supra note 153.
155. See id. (noting these areas are “mostly in peripheral, low-income
neighborhoods that contain large immigrant communities and lack robust public
transit”).
156. See Correal, supra note 152.
157. See Reiss, supra note 153 (“Dollar-van lines, by their nature, change slightly
from day to day owing to the needs of passengers, road maintenance, or the caprice
of drivers . . . .”).
158. Margonelli, supra note 153.
159. See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008); see
OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 54, at 3, 24;
see also Danielle Furfaro, Over Half of NYC Neighborhoods Leave Disabled People
Stranded, N.Y. POST (July 17, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://nypost.com/2018/07/17/over-
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ADA accessible stations are in Manhattan’s Lower East Side and
many parts of Harlem; in Queens, Long Island City; and in Brooklyn,
in the neighborhoods of Bushwick, Bay Ridge, Sunset Park, and most
of Coney Island. 160 Critically, of these sixty-two ADA transit deserts,
fifty-five are located in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens.161
Furthermore, 76% of New York City’s 472 subway stations are not
ADA accessible, with the quarter that are accessible geographically
clustered rather than evenly dispersed throughout neighborhoods.162
As a result, 640,000 mobility-impaired and elderly residents live near
subway stations that they cannot use. 163 For older New Yorkers,
parents with young children in strollers, and people who use
wheelchairs or have a disability, subway stations lacking elevators
limit their ability to travel. These riders must instead devise
alternative routes and plan out their travel to ensure they can access
transportation. 164 This may involve taking accessible buses to another
subway that is ADA accessible but further away from their home,
making for even longer commute times. 165 However, these residents
can alternatively call Uber or hail a taxi to take them to an accessible
station. Ride-share apps include an option for accessible vehicles,
and a new rule going into effect on July 1, 2019, will require rideshare
companies to complete 25% of their trips every year using wheelchairaccessible vehicles. 166 In fact, according to the City’s Mobility
Report, respondents who reported having a disability were
significantly more likely to call for a FHV several times a week than
were those who did not indicate having a disability. 167

half-of-nyc-neighborhoods-leave-disabled-people-stranded/ [https://perma.cc/PSG97FG4].
160. See Furfaro, supra note 159.
161. Id.
162. Id.;
see also Access2024, TRANSITCENTER (Jan. 31, 2019),
http://transitcenter.org/2019/01/31/access2024/ [https://perma.cc/FEQ4-ZUTR].
163. See SERVICE DENIED, supra note 147, at 4 (noting that ADA upgrades are not
only an “ethical measure towards greater inclusivity or a regulatory measure towards
legal compliance,” but essential in order to increase access to the subway system and
“relieve overcrowding at the handful of ‘key’ stations that serve a disproportionate
share of mobility-impaired riders”).
164. See id. at 2.
165. See id.
166. See Luis Ferré-Sadurní, Riders Outside Manhattan Can Now Hail Accessible
N.Y.
TIMES
(Jan.
24,
2018),
Taxis,
Too,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/24/nyregion/accessible-taxis-disabled-nyc.html
[https://perma.cc/VD8L-S634].
167. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 150, at 26.
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Meanwhile, paratransit services — a special transportation services
for people with disabilities — are generally not affordable. The
average cost of a paratransit ride in the United States is $29.30, which
is three and a half times more expensive than the average cost of a
regular fixed-route bus or rail trip. 168 While New York City’s
federally-mandated paratransit service, Access-A-Ride, costs only
$2.50 per ride (the same price as a subway fare), the MTA pays a
staggering $67.33 on average per trip. 169 In New York, Washington
D.C., Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Toronto, Uber is now
contracting directly with the paratransit firm MV Transportation to
provide services for disabled customers, promising a fifteen-minute
wait time or less and fares equivalent to UberX. 170 These wheelchairaccessible vehicles are operated by MV Transportation drivers using
the Uber app. 171 While fifteen minutes is still a long wait time, it is
more reliable than Access-a-Ride door-to-door paratransit service in
New York City, which can be “hit or miss,” according to wheelchair
users who cannot rely on the subway to get around because less than
a quarter are accessible to wheelchairs. 172 Even so, only 554 vehicles
out of the nearly 118,000 active rideshare vehicles are wheelchair
accessible, prompting accessibility advocates to sue Uber and Lyft for
providing “substandard or nonexistent service to people in

168. Luz Lazo, Uber Flirts with Transit Agencies Across the U.S. for a Share of
Services,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
5,
2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/uber-flirts-with-transitagencies-across-the-us-for-a-share-of-paratransit-services/2016/03/05/5eb8b118-d75111e5-9823-02b905009f99_story.html [https://perma.cc/6VFW-4BKF] (reporting that a
fixed-route bus or rail trip costs, on average, $8.15, according to the Government
Accountability Office).
169. Stephen M. Joseph & Michael Gartland, MTA Denying Access-A-Ride to
Some Riders Claiming Disabilities, N.Y. POST (Apr. 20, 2014, 4:26 AM),
https://nypost.com/2014/04/20/mta-denying-access-a-ride-to-some-riders-claimingdisabilities/ [https://perma.cc/FRM3-MU44].
170. Faiz Siddiqui, Wheelchair-Accessible Uber Service Comes to D.C. and Five
Other Cities, Expanding Mobility Options for People with Disabilities, WASH. POST:
BLOGS
(Nov.
20,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/transportation/2018/11/20/uber-launcheswheelchair-accessible-service-dc-five-other-cities/ [https://perma.cc/SH7P-MPM9].
171. See Taft, supra note 137.
172. Id. While paratransit rides in most cities need to be booked a day in advance,
riders are often forced to wait for late or delayed vans or spend long periods of time
on a bus following a scheduled pickup. Id. Wheelchair user, Valerie Piro,
commented that in the ten years she has used a wheelchair, she “has been routinely
stranded by no-show vans and trucked around for hours on tangled routes,” referring
to her “extended Access-A-Ride trips from . . . Bay Ridge to Manhattan as ‘the
Great Tour of Brooklyn.’” Id.

Paratransit
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wheelchairs.” 173
Notably, wheelchair-accessible vehicles
exempted from the City’s new law capping FHV licenses.

4.

are

Deteriorating Subway System Plagues the Entire Transit
Landscape

Subway delays have a more significant impact on low-income New
Yorkers, who tend to have longer commute times. 174 Moreover,
neighborhoods with lower household incomes — which tend to be in
the outer boroughs — are more likely to have longer periods of
unreliable service during the morning commute. 175 Delays for lowerincome commuters can have significant consequences, like missed
appointments or lost wages. 176 For commuters who work fixed shifts,
like fast food workers, the consequences are even more severe.
Riders with the longest commutes tend to have fewer backup options
because alternative lines are often further away, while commuters
who work night shifts or odd hours are more likely to encounter
commute disruptions for planned maintenance work. 177
Meanwhile, even with Governor Andrew M. Cuomo declaring the
subway to be in a state of emergency in 2017, the subway system is
still plagued by delays and overcrowding and is, in general, not
operating efficiently or improving. 178 According to the MTA, the
“on-time rate for weekday trains is about 66 percent,” which is down
from about 85% in 2012. 179
An increasingly unreliable subway system has, over the last five
years, prompted an uptick in rideshare use throughout the City. 180

173. Id. Uber and Lyft have been sued at least ten times nationwide by
accessibility advocates. Id.
174. Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Tyler Blint-Welsh, Subway Delays Hit Low-Income
New Yorkers the Hardest, Report Says, N.Y. TIMES (June 27, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/nyregion/mta-subway-delays-incomeneighborhoods.html [https://perma.cc/4C3G-D9XR].
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See Emma G. Fitzsimmons, Cuomo Declares a State of Emergency for New
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
29,
2017),
York
City
Subways,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/29/nyregion/cuomo-declares-a-state-of-emergencyfor-the-subway.html [https://perma.cc/627Q-RTL6].
179. Fitzsimmons & Blint-Welsh, supra note 174.
180. See BRUCE SCHALLER, MAKING CONGESTION PRICING WORK FOR TRAFFIC
AND
TRANSIT
IN
NEW
YORK
CITY
2–3
(2018),
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/makingpricingwork.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VM7F-V37M] (“The current trend toward more driving represents
a reversal of 25 years of less driving and more transit ridership in the city.”).
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Indeed, the extra fees associated with taking a yellow taxi are not as
affordable as public transit — especially for low-income commuters
— which makes the increased accessibility, lower costs, and stabilized
access of rideshares, and options like UberPOOL so much more
essential. If a permanent cap causes service by rideshares in these
areas to decrease, the costs associated with the ride will increase. 181
Additionally, riding the bus, especially from the outer boroughs,
makes for a slow commute with inefficient routes, too many stops,
and too many delays. However, with improved service, buses have
the potential to be “the future of New York City public transit,
connecting emerging job hubs outside of lower-Manhattan that are illserved by the subway’s hub-and-spoke network.” 182 New York is
home to 5700 buses along 330 routes with 16,000 stops and serves
over 2 million passengers a day, which accounts for more than the
daily ridership of LIRR, MetroNorth, PATH, and New Jersey Transit
combined. 183 And yet, as the Office of the New York City
Comptroller Scott M. Stringer notes, the bus system receives
insufficient attention compared to subways, commuter rail, and
bridges, and is “too often neglected” to be performing optimally.184
In fact, bus ridership is on the decline. Since 2011, ridership is down
by 16% in Manhattan, and 4% in Brooklyn. 185 Declining ridership is
no surprise when the average New York City bus spends half of its
time moving, and the other half in traffic. 186 Demographically, 75%
of bus commuters are people of color, and 55% are foreign born
(which is “significantly higher than subway commuters and New
Yorkers more generally”). 187 Regarding income level, the average
181. See generally id.
182. See OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 54,
at 1.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 5 (noting the bus system lost 100 million passenger rides in the last 8
years). In 2017, taxis and rideshare drivers transported three-quarters as many
people as local buses in New York City in 2017 (543 million taxi/for-hire passengers
compared with 712 million local bus passengers). See SCHALLER, supra note 180, at
4.
186. See id. (“21 percent is spent at red lights and 22 percent at bus stops.”).
Average bus speeds vary dramatically among the boroughs: the slowest average
speeds are in Manhattan (5.5 mph), Brooklyn (6.3 mph), and the Bronx (6.5 mph),
compared to local routes in Queens (8.1 mph) and Staten Island (11.4 mph). Id.
187. OFFICE OF THE N.Y.C. COMPTROLLER SCOTT M. STRINGER, supra note 54, at
9–10 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY (ACS): 20112015 ACS 5-YEAR ESTIMATES (2016), https://www.census.gov/programssurveys/acs/technical-documentation/table-and-geography-changes/2015/5-year.html
[https://perma.cc/588Y-CGR2]).
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personal income of bus commuters is $28,455, compared to $40,000
for subways commuters. 188 Therefore, low-income and minority
residents are hurt the most by the lack of effective bus service and
likewise may be most inclined to turn to services like UberPOOL.

5.

Yellow Taxis Do Not Reliably Service the Outer Boroughs

Yellow taxi cabs have traditionally underserved or unlawfully
denied rides to people and communities of color. 189 Research and
anecdotal evidence supports the notion that discrimination and
implicit racial biases affect the treatment of people of color in public
For example,
accommodations in general, including taxis. 190
“shopping while black” was coined to describe the racial profiling
experiences African American shoppers experience while in stores
when a clerk follows them around to ensure they are not
shoplifting, 191 and African Americans traditionally have a more
difficult time hailing taxi cabs. 192 As for the home-sharing economy,
a Harvard Business School study revealed that Airbnb users with
African American sounding names were 16% less likely to be
accepted as guests. 193 Anecdotally, the hashtag #AirbnbWhileBlack
188. Id. New Yorkers’ bus commuters have an average personal income of
$38,840, based on data from the United States Census Bureau. Id.
189. See Brown, supra note 142, at 135 (“[T]axi drivers’ discrimination against
black riders is as present today as it was in audit studies conducted three decades
ago . . . . Taxis failed to pick up black riders for more than one-quarter of their trip
hails (26.3%), compared to about one-fifth of trips hailed by Asian and Hispanic rider
(19.9%) and one-seventh (14.4%) of trips hailed by white riders. By contrast, ridehail
services nearly eliminated the differences across rider characteristics. On taxis, black
riders waited 52 percent longer (between about 6 and 15 minutes) than white riders;
by comparison, black riders waited between 11 seconds and 1 minute 43 seconds
longer for ridehail services than white riders.”) (citing STANLEY RIDLEY ET AL., TAXI
SERVICE IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: IS IT INFLUENCED BY PATRONS’ RACE AND
DESTINATION? (1989)).
190. See Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer, The New Public Accommodations: Race
Discrimination in the Platform Economy, 105 GEO. L.J. 1271, 1290 (2017).
191. See Dan Harris & Gitika Ahuja, Race for a Cab: When Hailing a Ride Isn’t
So Black and White, ABC NEWS (Apr. 1, 2009), https://abcnews.go.com/GMA/racecab-hailing-ride-black-white/story?id=7223511 [https://perma.cc/T9FW-NPE2].
192. See CORNELL BELCHER & DEE BROWN, HAILING WHILE BLACK:
NAVIGATING THE DISCRIMINATORY LANDSCAPE OF TRANSPORTATION 3 (2015),
http://www.brilliant-corners.com/post/hailing-while-black
[https://perma.cc/EC2BDTHV] (surveying the discriminatory transportation landscape in Chicago in an
Uber-sponsored study); see also Harris & Ahuja, supra note 191; see Leong &
Belzer, supra note 190, at 1290.
193. See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy:
Evidence from a Field Experiment, 2 AM. ECON. J. 9, 1 (2017). While the app-based,
algorithmic nature of rideshare platforms should theoretically rectify the historical
problem of discrimination in the transportation industry, a study conducted by
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is used by minority and black Airbnb users to highlight the
discrimination. 194 Overall, discrimination by taxi drivers has posed a
very real, unfair, and unlawful problem for minorities based on the
color of their skin or destination. 195
Faced with the accessibility issues of public transit, the prospect of
a private car or less-expensive carpool option at the tap of an app has
incentivized riders across all income groups to use the service. Thus,
seemingly overnight, rideshares have assimilated into the lives of citydwellers. The growing popularity and proliferation of rideshares is
evidence they fill a gap in New York City’s public transit system,196
particularly for lower-income communities, communities of color, and
for neighborhoods in the outer boroughs of New York, providing
these communities with access to reliable transportation. 197

researchers from Stanford, MIT, and the University of Washington found
discrimination on the basis of race and gender by individual rideshare drivers. See
Yanbo Ge et al., Racial and Gender Discrimination in Transportation Network
Companies (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research, Working Paper No. w22776, 2016); see
Taylor Kubota, Researchers from Stanford, MIT and the University of Washington
Find Ride-Share Drivers Discriminate Based on Race and Gender, STAN. NEWS (Oct.
31, 2016), https://news.stanford.edu/2016/10/31/researchers-stanford-mit-universitywashington-find-ride-share-drivers-discriminate-based-race-gender/
[https://perma.cc/99FB-SSTK]. While it is illegal for taxi drivers to deny a
streethailer, it is well-known that taxi drivers do discriminate, exercising “subjective”
discretion over who they stop for. See, e.g., Anne E. Brown, L.A.’s Taxi Industry

Discriminates Against Black Riders. If We Don’t Force Them to Change, They
L.A.
TIMES
(Aug.
12,
2018,
4:10
AM),
Won’t,
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/livable-city/la-oe-brown-racism-taxi-uber-lyft201812-story.html [https://perma.cc/9UM6-2KW5]; Neuman, supra note 45.
Rideshare drivers on the other hand connect with passengers using an app’s objective
algorithm. Conducting tests in Seattle and Boston, using African American and
white university students to study the behavior of UberX and Lyft drivers, the
Stanford, MIT, and the University of Washington researchers collected data on
nearly 1500 rides on controlled routes. See Ge et al., supra. While the wait time
discrepancy for passengers with African American-sounding names was minimal (a
30% longer wait tended to be a ninety-second difference and could be based on a
variety of factors), the cancellation rate for African American sounding names was
more than twice as frequent compared to white sounding names. Id. at 9, 12.
Moreover, because rideshare platforms operate using a rating system, “the likelihood
that the ratings will reflect the conscious or unconscious bias of the provider entering
the rating” is increased. See Leong & Belzer, supra note 190, at 1293. But see text
accompanying supra note 189.
194. See Maggie Penman et al., #AirbnbWhileBlack: How Hidden Bias Shapes
NPR
(Apr.
26,
2016,
12:10
AM),
The
Sharing
Economy,
https://www.npr.org/2016/04/26/475623339/-airbnbwhileblack-how-hidden-biasshapes-the-sharing-economy [https://perma.cc/65W7-G3WW].
195. See generally Leong & Belzer, supra note 190.
196. See SCHALLER, supra note 180, at 4.
197. See Carl Bialik et al., Uber Is Serving New York’s Outer Boroughs More
Than Taxis Are, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Aug. 10, 2015, 2:06 PM),
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D. The Transportation Landscape in Light of Rideshares
Research supports the City’s assertion that the increased number
of vehicles, which is linked to the rideshare economy’s recent growth,
has lowered traffic speeds, especially in denser areas of Manhattan
below 60th street. 198 Traffic speeds have declined consistently since
2012, from 9.1 miles per hour in 2010 to 7.2 miles per hour in 2016 199
— a 23% reduction in rate. 200 Further, the average wait time for
drivers, in between trips, is now eleven minutes, while the number of
unoccupied taxi or FHV vehicles has increased by 81% in
Manhattan’s central business district since 2013. 201 According to one
transportation analytics firm, lost hours spent in traffic and the excess
fuel costs as a result of longer times spent on the road cost the New
York City economy $17 billion in 2016. 202 However, the disparate
impact that such a cap on FHVs will have on outer borough
communities should dissuade the TLC from permanently
implementing one moving forward.

1.

Problems Arising as a Result of a Permanent Cap

Access to rideshares in the boroughs will become even more
restricted if the supply of FHVs remains permanently capped.
Drivers will opt instead to drive around areas they expect to have
higher demand — such as Midtown, Manhattan. As transportation
expert Bruce Schaller notes:
[v]ehicle caps have been used for taxicabs for decades in major cities
across the country. They have been applied to overall fleet size,
however. Rather than reducing traffic in the most congested part of

https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/uber-is-serving-new-yorks-outer-boroughs-morethan-taxis-are/ [https://perma.cc/GXT8-3V7Q].
198. See generally HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51.
199. See N.Y.C. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 150, at 13, 18; see also Vincent
Barone, Congestion Pricing, Not a Cap on Uber, Will Fix NYC Traffic Woes,
AMNEWYORK (June 25, 2018, 8:06 PM), https://www.amny.com/transit/congestionpricing-nyc-1.19429971 [https://perma.cc/U6QD-RTE7] (“[T]ravel speeds in
Manhattan below 60th Street slowed to 7.2 mph last year, a drop from 9.1 mph in
2010.”); Laura Bliss, supra note 112 (noting that the average traffic speed in central
Manhattan during business hours dropped to about six miles per hour in 2017).
200. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 5.
201. See BRUCE SCHALLER, EMPTY SEATS, FULL STREETS: FIXING MANHATTAN’S
TRAFFIC
PROBLEM
1
(2018),
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/emptyseats.pdf [https://perma.cc/P3A9XM6D].
202. See Bliss, supra note 112.
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town, the result has been that cab drivers tend to concentrate in
congested downtown areas where trip demand is most intense. 203

Thus, as a result of a cap, customers in the outer boroughs
searching for a rideshare vehicle will likely suffer from even longer
wait times and inflated prices.
In addition, there tends to be high turnover amongst Uber drivers.
For example, the thirty-day user retention for the Uber driver app
dropped to around 47% between January and May of 2017 based on
an analysis of app downloads and usage. 204 If potential new drivers
are unable to obtain a vehicle, either because leasing an already
licensed FHV is too expensive or because they are unable to now
license their personal vehicle as an FHV as a result of the
moratorium, then the number of available rideshare drivers will fall
over time, further impacting supply. Similarly, not all rideshare
drivers work full-time. A big draw of the gig economy for workers is
that they can drive for Uber or Lyft as a part-time independent
contractor for a source of alternative income.

2.

In Light of Enduring Transit Inequality, Rideshares Provide
Meaningful Service

Ridesharing’s popularity and growth in New York City and other
urban centers over the last decade is evidence not simply of society’s
enthusiasm for a tech-dominated world, but also of a very real need
for reliable transportation. 205 Lawmakers should recognize and

203. BRUCE SCHALLER, THE NEW AUTOMOBILITY: LYFT, UBER AND THE FUTURE
AMERICAN
CITIES
30
(2018),
http://www.schallerconsult.com/rideservices/automobility.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6ZMA-NG2S].
204. See Natasha Lomas, Uber Has Seen a Sharp Drop in New Driver Retention
TECHCRUNCH
(June
23,
2017),
this
Year:
Apptopia,
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/23/uber-has-seen-a-sharp-drop-in-new-driverretention-this-year-apptopia/ [https://perma.cc/4RSJ-TT22]. In June 2017, Uber
made driver retention a focus with its “180 Days of Change” pledge to make
improvements for its 750,000 drivers in the United States (and 2 million drivers
globally). See Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber Has More Work to Do Winning over
CNN:
BUSINESS
(Dec.
18,
2017,
11:54
AM),
Drivers,
https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/uber-drivers-180-days-ofchange/index.html [https://perma.cc/6PT3-5PFH] (“Among the new features
introduced since June are a 24/7 hotline for drivers, payment for the time drivers
spend waiting for fares, and changes to the app to make it easier for customers to
tip.”).
205. See Abbey Stemler, Betwixt and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy,
43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 35 (2016) (“There are three interconnected forces that
gave rise to the sharing economy: modern trust, technology, and economic
pressure.”).
OF
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capitalize that rideshares are filling an essential “transit gap” — a notso-new phenomenon where people without cars, dependent on transit
to get to work and live productively in their urban society, have to
turn to alternative options like rideshares for transportation.206
Transportation is inextricably linked to one’s quality of life, impacting
“health, education, employment, economic development, access to
municipal services, residential mobility, and environmental
quality.” 207 Private cars remain the dominant mode of transportation
in America and, in New York City, transit inequity is being further
exacerbated
by
gentrification
and
continued
residential
segregation. 208 Although equal access to mass transportation was at
the forefront of the civil rights movement, from Rosa Parks refusing
to give up her bus seat to a white passenger in 1955 (leading to the
Montgomery Bus Boycotts), to the Freedom Riders of 1961, and even

206. See Robert D. Bullard, Addressing Urban Transportation Equity in the
United States, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1183, 1191 (2003) (“Lack of car ownership and

inadequate public transit service in many central cities and metropolitan regions with
a high proportion of ‘captive’ transit dependents exacerbate social, economic, and
racial isolation, especially for low-income people of color—residents who already
have limited transportation options.”).
207. Id. at 1184; see Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1038 (“[I]n most regions,
local urban transit services (mostly bus, but sometimes light rail) typically provide the
workhorse connectivity required to meet daily travel needs for those without
automobiles.”); Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1035–36 (“Because individuals
generally must travel to reach their desired destinations, mobility and access are a
precondition for participating in critical, life-enhancing activities such as
employment, education, health care, and social contact.”).
208. See Bullard, supra note 206, at 1184 (calling this phenomenon potentially “a
new urban crisis and a new form of ‘residential apartheid’”); see also Sean B.
Seymore, Set the Captives Free!: Transit Inequity in Urban Centers, and the Laws
and Policies Which Aggravate the Disparity, 16 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 57, 65–66
(2005). Seymore states that:
“White flight” and the racial polarization of metropolitan areas lie at the
heart of modern transit inequity. Both of these phenomena have been
fueled by the construction of the interstate highway system. Transportation
and urban development plans destroyed black communities, split them in
half, or physically separated black residents from transportation, jobs, and
white persons. These policies and practices laid the foundation for lowincome minority enclaves, which were usually concentrated in central cities
or unstable older communities. As jobs, wealth, and political power moved
to the suburbs, transportation planning was directed toward highway
development rather than transit access.

Id.
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harkening back to 1896 with Plessy v. Ferguson, 209 transit inequity
continues to endure today. 210
Based on the evidence that ridesharing is working as an alternative
to public transit, particularly when comparison to the traditional
business of capped taxis, regulators need to take seriously the promise
of this new economy and regulate it by different rules and regulations
— otherwise these transit disparities will continue to endure.
II. SEEKING JUSTICE AND TRANSIT EQUALITY
If the City’s temporary blanket cap on rideshare vehicles is to
become permanent, it would leave residents worse off, hindering
residents’ much-needed access to transportation in transit deserts, and
disproportionately affect low-income communities, communities of
color, and ADA passengers. Section II.A. examines whether transit
equity advocates or residents could seek relief through the courts
under civil rights laws, as a result of the disparate impact that would
be created by a permanent cap on the number of rideshare vehicles in
the five boroughs. 211 If New York City’s actions violate any of these
statutes, then what obligation or responsibility does the City have to
provide an alternative scheme (if any)? Section II.B. addresses the
framework for evaluating the legality of a permanent cap, should the
TLC attempt to implement one.
A. Constitutionality
Section II.A. examines the constitutionality of Int. No. 144-B, and
possible arguments transit advocates could raise in support of the
argument that the new law is unlawfully discriminatory because it
decreases access to meaningful transportation options in outer

209. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
210. See David B. Oppenheimer, Color-Blindness, Racism-Blindness, and RacismAwareness: Revisiting Judge Henderson’s Proposition 209 Decision, 13 BERKELEY J.
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 229, 251 (2011) (“[S]ubsidized public transportation is
disproportionately provided to white neighborhoods, even though the need is greater
in minority neighborhoods, where fewer people can afford to own cars.”).
211. See Seymore, supra note 208, at 74 (“Even though Congress and the President
seek to bring transportation equity to the urban core, ‘the executive orders, laws, and
regulations are only as good as their enforcement.’ Residents in low-income
communities must constantly fight for their rights in spite of clear-cut mandates. The
continued disparate treatment has caused the transportation equity and
environmental justice movement to seek relief through the courts.”) (citing Robert
D. Bullard, The Anatomy of Transportation Racism, in HIGHWAY ROBBERY:
TRANSPORTATION RACISM & NEW ROUTES TO EQUITY 15, 25 (Robert D. Bullard et
al. eds., 2004)).
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boroughs and transit deserts. And, if advocates cannot raise any
effectively, why it is therefore troubling for a city to regulate
something that private citizens cannot challenge in court.

1.

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964

Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a federal law that broadly
prohibits discriminatory policies and practices, stating, “[n]o person in
the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national
origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or
be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity
receiving Federal financial assistance.” 212 Under Title VI, “program
or activity” refers to all operations that receive federal financial
assistance by:
a department, agency, special purpose district, or other
instrumentality of a State or of a local government; or The entity of
such State or local government that distributes such assistance and
each such department or agency (and each other State or local
government entity) to which the assistance is extended, in the case
of assistance to a State or local government. 213

Referred to as the “sleeping giant” of civil rights law, Title VI was
passed to ensure taxpayer dollars are not “spent in any fashion which
encourages, entrenches, subsidizes or results in racial
discrimination.” 214 It also provides that recipients of federal funds
cannot “utilize criteria or methods of administration which have the
effect of subjecting individuals to discrimination because of their race,
color, or national origin,” in addition to prohibiting intentional

212. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d).
213. Title VI § 2000d–4a(1). As a result of the 1988 amendments to the Act,
“program or activity” is defined broadly to include “all of the operations” of state or
local governments “any part of which is extended Federal financial assistance.” Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 1987 § 6, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d–4a. Federal regulations make
clear that “[f]ederal financial assistance” includes grants, loans of funds, donations or
grants of federal property, and the detail of federal personnel. See 28 C.F.R. §
42.102(c) (2013).
214. See Jerett Yan, Rousing the Sleeping Giant: Administrative Enforcement of
Title VI and New Routes to Equity in Transit Planning, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1131,
1134–35 (2013); see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROTECTING AGAINST RACE,
COLOR, AND NATIONAL ORIGIN DISCRIMINATION BY RECIPIENTS OF FEDERAL FUNDS
2 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/cor/4yr_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/5FEFSUXD] (quoting Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Rights Division, Thomas
E. Perez).
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discrimination. 215 While Title VI has been successfully used to fight
racial disparities in transportation-related claims, 216 “typical transit
agency equity policy consists of little more than the box-checking
exercise required by federal ‘Title VI’ regulation, which is designed to
limit further harm to people of color — not to advance equity.” 217
It is questionable as to whether Title VI could be used by transit
advocates and rideshare users to challenge the City’s cap on
rideshares. Title VI plainly pertains to activities and services
receiving federal funding, and Uber, Lyft, and the like are privately
owned corporations that do not receive direct federal funding.218
Traditionally, in the context of transportation equity in New York
City, Title VI claims have been raised against public authorities like
the MTA, a commuter rail service (which receives federal funds to
maintain the City’s bus and subway systems); the New York City
Transportation Authority (“NYCTA”), a public bus and rail service;
the Metro-North Commuter Railroad (“Metro-North”), a commuter
rail service to the northern suburb; and the Long Island Railroad
(“LIRR”), a commuter rail service to Long Island. 219 The TLC itself

215. 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b)(2) (2013); 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (2013); see also
Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Lawyering that Has No Name: Title VI and the Meaning of
Private Enforcement, 66 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2014).
216. See, e.g., Labor/Cmty. Strategy Ctr. v. L.A. Cty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 263
F.3d 1041, 1043–44 (9th Cir. 2001); N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. Metro. Transp. Auth.,
905 F. Supp. 1266 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), vacated by N.Y. Urban League, Inc. v. New York,
71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).
217. ZAK ACCUARDI, TRANSITCENTER, INCLUSIVE TRANSIT: ADVANCING EQUITY
THROUGH IMPROVED ACCESS & OPPORTUNITY 6 (2018), http://transitcenter.org/wp“The
content/uploads/2018/07/Inclusive-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LWN-UHJ2].
industry-standard ‘Title VI’ analysis, a federal Civil Rights law compliance
requirement, does not require a rigorous standard for evaluating whether planned
projects, service cuts, or fare changes are likely to create disparate impacts on
communities of color.” Id. at 32.
218. In some cities, rideshare companies may receive a subsidy by the local
government to provide more affordable rides. Wyatt Cmar, How Cities Are
Integrating Rideshare and Public Transportation, GOV’T TECH. (Feb. 14, 2017),
https://www.govtech.com/dc/articles/How-Cities-are-Integrating-Rideshare-andPublic-Transportation.html [https://perma.cc/YX79-599A]. As of yet, providing
subsidies to rideshare users has not occurred in New York City, though the use of
commuter benefits, or paying with pre-tax dollars, has for UberPOOL rides. Id. But
see Sarah Buhr, It’s Not Your Imagination, You Are Waiting Longer for an
UberPOOL Using Your Commuter Card, TECHCRUNCH (June 28, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/06/28/its-not-your-imagination-you-are-waiting-longerfor-an-uberpool-using-your-commuter-card/ [https://perma.cc/Q3EF-2E7W].
219. See David A. King, Why Public Transit Is Not Living Up to Its Social
Contract,
CITYLAB
(June
26,
2014),
https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2014/06/why-public-transit-is-not-living-up-toits-social-contract/373368/ [https://perma.cc/24U8-F9WW].
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receives federal funding as a licensing and regulatory agency for
rideshares, but its funding is provided by City tax-levy funds.220
Nevertheless, insofar that Title VI does provide an enforcement
mechanism by which aggrieved transit advocates or residents could
sue for discrimination, it is an important framework by which to
understand these discrimination claims resulting from the actions and
regulations by a city agency. Where Section 601 of Title VI bars
recipients of federal funds from “subjecting beneficiaries to racial
discrimination,” Section 602 directs “federal agencies to promulgate
regulations which ‘effectuate the provisions of 601.’” 221
For example, in Labor/Community Strategy Center v. Los Angeles
County Metropolitan Transportation Authority, minority bus riders
originally sued the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation
Authority under Title VI for funding and expanding rail services used
primarily by white, suburban commuters, while at the same time
reducing funding for buses that were largely ridden by minorities. 222
The district court held that the MTA violated Title VI’s disparate
impact regulations, and the plaintiffs and MTA negotiated a consent
decree that increased funding and services for the bus system. 223 The
consent decree entailed the transportation authority ultimately
agreeing to make service improvements in the bus fleet to alleviate
overcrowding, but fourteen months after the decree, the bus riders
sued for enforcement, alleging the transportation authority failed to
meet its obligations. While the minority bus riders’ grassroots
advocacy was ultimately effective through litigation, this suit seeking
enforcement of the consent decree proves how difficult it is to obtain
compliance. 224 Conversely, in New York Urban League, Inc. v. New
York, the Second Circuit reversed the district court’s finding that the
State was preliminarily enjoined from implementing a proposed fare
increase on subways and buses, in violation of Title VI. 225 Plaintiffs,
originally suing for an injunction, claimed that NYCTA riders of the
subway and bus system, a majority of whom are members of
protected minority groups, pay a higher share of the cost of operating
220. See COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE FINANCE DIVISION
ON THE FISCAL 2019 PRELIMINARY BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2018 PRELIMINARY
MAYOR’S MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE TAXI AND LIMOUSINE COMMISSION 2
(2018),
https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2018/03/FY19Taxi-and-Limousine-Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PFS-CMUH].
221. Title VI §§ 601–02.
222. 263 F.3d 104, 1043 (9th Cir. 2001).
223. Id. at 1047.
224. See Yan, supra note 214, at 1143.
225. 71 F.3d 1031, 1040 (2d Cir. 1995)
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these systems than commuter line passengers, who are predominantly
white, pay to support the commuter rail system. 226 Consequently,
they claim that this is forbidden by U.S. Department of
Transportation (“U.S. DOT”) regulations promulgated under Title
VI. 227 The Second Circuit found that the District Court did not assert
a sufficient enough basis for disparate impact. 228 Furthermore, even
if for argument’s sake plaintiffs had made a prima facie showing of
disparate impact, the court found that the defendants showed a
substantial legitimate justification for the challenged conduct. 229 That
being said, minority communities have at times been successful in
challenging regulations and transportation schemes under Title VI.
While technical functions of Title VI may bar transit advocates from
suing the City based on their regulations capping Uber, it is
nevertheless important to analyze the City’s new law under this lens.
Finally, private vehicles and independent contractor drivers for
FHVs function in the public sphere. Anyone is a potential customer
who may call for a ride, so long as they have smartphone access.230
Further, FHVs are changing the transportation landscape. 231 From
serving more passengers than taxis to capturing riders that would
otherwise be using public transit, rideshares have tapped into a
market of customers who are replacing public transit methods with
rideshares. 232 In addition, Uber and Lyft have begun accepting
responsibility for this evolution by investing in plans to support
sustainable mobility and transit innovation, such as by sharing trip
data with cities and helping to come up with more effective street
designs that will positively impact traffic patterns. 233 Moreover, with
Uber’s expansion into even more inherently communal or shared
services like bikes and scooters 234 — and one day, autonomous

226. Id. at 1033.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1038.
229. Id. at 1038–39.
230. See supra Section I.B.1.
231. See supra Section I.C.1.
232. See supra Section I.C.1.
233. Patrick Sisson, Uber Makes $10M Bet on Bikes and Transit, CURBED (Sept.
26, 2018, 1:29 PM), https://www.curbed.com/2018/9/26/17903112/uber-darakhosrowshahi-electric-bikes-transit
[https://perma.cc/4MPW-7NKM].
Uber
announced it will share “more segmented, street-level speed data, and help develop
best practices for street design, part of a collaboration between Ford, Uber, and Lyft
to offer actionable information to help local governments better manage curb space.”

Id.

234. Id. (“Uber will spend $10 million over three years as part of a Fund for
Sustainable Mobility to support campaigns for safety and improved transit. This will
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vehicles — its push into the public transportation realm (call it a
quasi-public realm) is even more apparent. Uber’s new CEO, Dara
Khosrowshahi, even announced he wants Uber to become the
“Amazon of transportation.” 235 In Mr. Khosrowshahi’s utopia, Uber
would “offer third party transportation services” to allow “any
transportation, totally frictionless, real time.” 236 Transportation
would be optimized linearly so the rider or commuter could choose
between alternatives (from bikes to Uber to public transit). 237
Arguably, if Uber were to assimilate linearly alongside public
transit like buses and subways, an exception may need to be made
qualifying rideshares of this type to be classified as “public
transportation.” 238 Should Uber, as a private company, down the
line become “public transportation,” decisions as to whether or not
Title VI applies should probably not be determined by whether it
receives federal funding. The federal funding limitation for Title VI
applicability would be difficult to justify in this hypothetical scenario,
as such linear accessibility between Ubers and public transit would
necessitate Uber working closely alongside the City government.
Even if Uber does not receive federal funding to the extent that the
MTA does, Uber would be acting as a system of public
transportation. This behavior by a public company may therefore
warrant and trigger the type of protections for racial minorities Title

include a $1 million investment to push for the passage of congestion pricing in New
York City as well as funding for the non-profit PeopleForBikes.”); see also Andrew
J. Hawkins, Coming Soon to the Uber App: Bikes, Rental Cars, and Public
VERGE
(Apr.
11,
2018,
10:30
AM),
Transportation,
https://www.theverge.com/2018/4/11/17220408/uber-jump-getaround-masabi-citiesdata [https://perma.cc/LE6R-HTJC]. Residents of Washington, D.C. are now able to
reserve and pay for Jump bikes using Uber’s app, following Uber’s acquisition of the
electric, dockless bike-sharing company. And in San Francisco, Uber launched a new
car-sharing program called “Uber Rent,” allowing users to rent cars on Uber’s app
through a partnership with Getaround. This opportunity has since been expanded to
Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Diego. Prior to this new product, Uber’s
partnership with Getaround allowed people who wanted to drive for Uber, but who
did not own their own vehicle, to rent cars via the Uber app. Id.
235. Recode, Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi Says He Wants to Be the “Amazon
YOUTUBE
(May
30,
2018),
of
Transportation”,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5Yo32U4mtE0 [https://perma.cc/TB6X-MM2B].
236. Recode, Full Video and Transcript: Uber CEO Dara Khosrowshahi at Code
2018,
RECODE
(June
4,
2018,
1:27
PM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/5/31/17397186/full-transcript-uber-dara-khosrowshahicode-2018 [https://perma.cc/VL52-TUBP].
237. Id.
238. Currently, the market of Ubers versus subways is like choosing between
apples and oranges; Uber’s dream to become the “Amazon of transportation” would
create the effect of choosing between apples and apples.
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VI was meant to protect. Under this lens, a blanket cap on rideshares
coupled with the existing phenomenon of transit deserts would
further highlight the disparate impact in the outer boroughs and for
communities of color.
If plaintiffs could raise claims under Title VI in fighting the TLC
and City’s regulation of rideshare companies, the bar to proving such
a violation is nonetheless very high and very difficult to prove in the
wake of the Supreme Court’s key 2001 decision in Alexander v.
Sandoval — a transportation case itself. 239 In Sandoval, the Supreme
Court held that no private right of action existed to enforce Title VI’s
disparate impact regulations and that challengers of an allegedly
discriminatory policy must prove the policy intended to cause
discrimination, not that it merely had a discriminatory impact.240
Thus, Sandoval’s elimination of private actors’ utilization of the
courts to implement Title VI severely weakened Title VI’s potential
bite against state defendants and federal funding recipients like the
TLC. There is little basis that the City’s regulatory scheme regarding
a cap on the number of rideshares, most of all in a progressive city
like New York City, would be implemented with the intent to cause
discrimination.

2.

EJ Executive Order and Administrative Enforcement

Sandoval’s weakening of judicial enforcement of Title VI’s

regulations (by eliminating a private right of action) does, however,
leave open the possibility of seeking administrative enforcement of
Title VI. 241 Individuals may no longer have a right of action to
enforce Title VI disparate impact regulations in federal courts, but
Title VI regulations are nevertheless still valid. As asserted by the
Civil Rights Division’s 2001 memo following Sandoval for “Heads of
Departments and Agencies, General Counsels and Civil Rights
Directors,” funding agencies retained their authority and
responsibility to enforce Title VI regulations. Thus, a funding
agency’s Title VI disparate impact regulation continues to be a vital

239. 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (arising out of Alabama plaintiffs’ efforts to provide
access to driver’s licenses for individuals that were not English-proficient).
240. Id. Holding that the implied private right of action does not exist, the
Supreme Court found that § 601 of Title VI allowed a plaintiff only to sue an agency
or program for intentional discrimination. Id. at 293.
241. C.R. DIVISION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TITLE VI LEGAL MANUAL 5 (2019),
https://www.justice.gov/crt/case-document/file/923556/download
[https://perma.cc/FKS4-RLQ8].
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administrative enforcement mechanism. 242 In particular, the EJ
Executive Order issued by President Bill Clinton in 1994 requires
federal agencies and entities receiving federal funds to implement
Title VI by incorporating environmental justice concerns concerning
planning and regulations. The Order states that federally funded
entities must “identify[] and address[], as appropriate,
disproportionately high and adverse human health or environmental
effects of [their] programs, policies, and activities on minority
populations and low-income populations . . . .” 243 Furthermore, it
“prohibits the exclusion of persons (or populations) from
participating in, reaping the benefits of, or being discriminated against
under such programs, policies, and activities, because of their race,
color, or national origin.” 244 By protecting “populations” rather than
just “communities,” the EJ Executive Order thus “extends its
protections to ‘low-income populations’ not otherwise protected
under federal civil rights law.” 245
The test used by courts to determine whether a recipient’s policy or
practice violates Title VI’s disparate impact regulations is aligned
with that used in the pre-Sandoval case, New York Urban League,
Inc. 246 In New York Urban League, Inc., the court assessed (1)
whether the adverse effect of the practice or policy disproportionately
affect members of a group identified by race, color, or national origin
(also referred to as a prima facie inquiry); (2) if so, whether the
recipient can demonstrate the existence of a substantial legitimate
justification for the policy or practice; and (3) whether there is an
alternative that would achieve the same legitimate objective but with
less of a discriminatory effect. 247
Lastly, the U.S. DOT is “one of the federal agencies charged with
oversight authority,” and thus, the U.S. DOT’s regulations include
affirmative obligations such as “to remove or overcome the effects of

242. Id.
243. Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994).
244. See Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1047.
245. Id. (noting the significance of “population” for transportation-related issues,
as “population” denotes not only residents of a specific geography, but also similarly
situated populations that live far apart from each other. This is crucial for “users of a
particular portion of the transportation network, such as buses, and who are ‘similarly
affected’ by a plan or policy,” as they may comprise of a protective population
compared to under Title VI, in which low-income populations would not be classified
as protected.).
246. 71 F.3d 1031 (2d Cir. 1995).
247. Id.; see also N.Y.C. Env’t Justice All. v. Giuliani, 214 F.3d 65, 68–72 (2d Cir.
2000).
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discrimination . . . ’ [e]ven in the absence of prior discriminatory
practice . . . .’ to ensure no future discrimination occurs.” 248 However,
although the U.S. DOT and Federal Transit Authority (which funds
state and local transportation agencies) govern public transit like the
MTA in New York City, they do not have regulatory or licensing
authority over rideshare vehicles (which fall under the authority of
the TLC). Depending on how the U.S. DOT involves itself in
regulating and overseeing rideshares in the future, aggrieved plaintiffs
may have more access to make discrimination claims under the EJ
Executive Order and Title VI.

3.

Equal Protection Claims

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibits states from denying any person equal protection of the
laws. 249 Rideshare users from the outer boroughs who are negatively
impacted by a cap, and other transit equity advocates, could
contemplate raising Equal Protection claims under the theory that a
cap on rideshares violates their right to intrastate travel. 250 However,
while the Second Circuit recognizes a constitutional right to intrastate
travel, or the right to free movement, 251 when a statute or regulation
merely has “an effect on travel” that right does not appear to “raise
an issue of constitutional dimension.” 252 Although universal access to
transportation is inspirational as a policy matter, it is not a
constitutionally granted right. 253 Certainly, a permanent cap on the
number of rideshare vehicles will have an effect on lower-income,
outer-borough residents, but because it does not rise to any

248. See Marcantonio et al., supra note 136, at 1042.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires the government to treat all similarly situated individuals alike.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).
250. Nassau & Suffolk Cty. Taxi Owners Ass’n v. New York, 336 F. Supp. 3d 50, 76
(2018) (citing Harlen Assocs. v. Inc. Vill. of Mineola, 273 F.3d 494, 499 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he prototypical equal protection involves discrimination against people based on
their membership in a vulnerable class . . . .”)).
251. Ramos v. Town of Vernon, 353 F.3d 171, 176 (2d Cir. 2003); King v. New
Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
863 (1971); see Spencer v. Casavilla, 903 F.2d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he
Constitution . . . protects the right to travel freely within a single state.”).
252. Soto-Lopez v. N.Y.C. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 755 F.2d 266, 278 (2d Cir. 1985).
253. The Supreme Court does recognize the right to travel as a fundamental right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. See generally Sáenz v.
Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999). However, that right is not unlimited, extending so far as to
grant universal access to transportation.
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constitutionally relevant level, an Equal Protection argument is
unlikely to be accessible for potential plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, another aspect under Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment that potential claimants could raise is a
“class of one” argument, wherein the plaintiff alleges an equal
protection violation without alleging discrimination based on
membership in a particular, protected class, the “the equal protection
guarantee also extends to individuals who allege no specific class
membership but are nonetheless subjected to invidious discrimination
at the hands of government officials.” 254 A class of one plaintiff
“must plausibly allege that he or she has been intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and no rational basis exists
for that different treatment.” 255 In this case, “similarity” would mean
arguing that:
(i) no rational person could regard the circumstances of the plaintiff
to differ from those of a comparator to a degree that would justify
the differential treatment on the basis of a legitimate government
policy; and (ii) the similarity in circumstances and difference in
treatment are sufficient to exclude the possibility that the defendants
acted on the basis of a mistake. 256

Courts require the plaintiff to show she and her comparators are
“prima facie identical” to those who are allegedly receiving
“irrationally different” treatment, 257 to prove “an inference that the
difference in treatment ‘lack[s] any reasonable nexus with a legitimate
governmental policy.’” 258
Positioning themselves as residents of outer boroughs compared to
residents who live either closer to transportation, or within the areas
of Manhattan that are well-known to be serviced by taxis, challengers
may be able to raise a “class of one” argument because they could
argue that rideshares mitigated the lack of yellow taxis in areas like
the outer boroughs. The standard of review for a government action
that purportedly violates the Equal Protection Clause is rational basis
review, meaning that there is no violation if the disparate treatment is
254. Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 49 (2d Cir. 2018)
(“Such a claim, often referred to as a ‘class of one’ equal protection claim, stems from
the Equal Protection Clause’s requirement that the government treat all similarly
situated people alike.”).
255. Id. at 49 (citing Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000)).
256. Nassau & Suffolk Cty. Taxi Owners Ass’n v. New York, 336 F. Supp. 3d 50, 76
(2018) (citing Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208, 222 (2d Cir. 2012)).
257. Neilson v. D’Angelis, 409 F.3d 100, 105 (2d Cir. 2005).
258. Nassau & Suffolk Cty. Taxi Owners Ass’n, 336 F. Supp. 3d at 77 (citing
Progressive Credit Union v. City of New York, 889 F.3d 40, 49 (2018)).
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ultimately linked to a justifiable end (and in this case, that justifiable
end would be the City Council’s attempt to reduce traffic congestion).
As a matter of threshold, if the City were to overtly ban all rideshares
throughout the five boroughs, then potential claimants would have a
stronger argument.

4.

Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 Claims (Title II and
Title III)

The ADA is a civil rights law enacted in 1990 prohibiting
discrimination against individuals with disabilities in all areas of
public life including jobs, schools, transportation, and all public and
private places that are open to the general public. 259 Disabled riders
have filed several lawsuits arguing that a lack of accessibility in
rideshares and taxis violates the ADA.
Noel v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Commission is one such
case providing several guiding principles by which we may understand
the regulation of the taxi industry — and possibly rideshare — under
the ADA. 260 In 2012, plaintiffs sued the TLC alleging the City’s taxi
services failed to provide disabled persons with meaningful access to
transportation, discriminating in violation of the ADA Title II(A).
But the Second Circuit found that “Title II . . . and its implementing
regulations prohibit discrimination against qualified individuals only
by public entities” and do “not go so far as to require public entities
to impose on private establishments, as a condition of licensure, a
requirement that they make their facilities physically accessible to
persons with disabilities.” In other words, although the TLC
regulates and controls the taxi industry in New York City, it is not
required under ADA Title II(A) to “deploy their licensing and
regulatory authority to mandate that persons who needed wheelchairs
be afforded meaningful access to taxis.” 261
Title II of the ADA concerns discrimination against individuals
with disabilities in access to public services, whereas Title III concerns
public accommodations. The Noel plaintiffs raised challenges under
Title II’s public services provision rather than Title III’s public
accommodations, which taxis traditionally fall under, 262 because Title

259. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2009).
260. 687 F.3d 63 (2d Cir. 2012).
261. Id. at 65. The Second Circuit noted that “[a]lthough licensing standards are
covered by [T]itle II, the licensee’s activities themselves are not covered. An activity
does not become a ‘program or activity’ of a public entity merely because it is
licensed by the public entity.” Id. at 70.
262. See supra Section II.A.4.
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III expressly exempts taxi providers from being required to purchase
or lease “accessible automobiles.” 263 Under Title III of the ADA,
“[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services,
facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of
public accommodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to),
or operates a place of public accommodation.” 264
The Second Circuit thus used Title III’s exemption to bolster its
Title II(A) denial: If the TLC were required under Title II(A) to
ensure that private taxi providers required a sufficient number of
accessible vehicles, then this requirement would be in tension with the
ADA’s explicit Title III exemption for taxis. 265 However, the Noel
court did concede that “more such [accessible] taxis would be on the
streets if the TLC required more of them to be accessible. But the
TLC’s failure to use its regulatory authority does not amount to
discrimination within the meaning of the ADA or its regulations.” 266
In November 2018, plaintiffs filed a class action in the Southern
District of New York against Lyft for failing to provide wheelchairaccessible vehicles, thus excluding people with mobility disabilities
from using their service in Lowell v. Lyft, Inc.. 267 To state a claim for
relief under Title III, a plaintiff must show: (1) he or she is disabled
within the meaning of the ADA; (2) the defendants own, lease, or
operate a place of public accommodation; and (3) the defendants
discriminated against the plaintiff by denying them a full and equal
The Lowell
opportunity to enjoy the defendant’s services. 268
plaintiffs are suing Lyft, a rideshare company, directly under Title III
claims, and Title III explicitly exempts taxis. FHVs are not explicitly
written into Title III — yet — so, as a result, the defendant’s motion
to dismiss was denied. However, Lowell (pending in court) has yet to

263. 49 C.F.R. § 37.29(b).
264. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a).
265. Noel, 687 F.3d at 73–74. (“If the TLC is required under Title II(A) to ensure
that the taxi industry provides a sufficient number of accessible taxis, then private
taxi owners would be required to purchase or lease accessible taxis even though the
ADA explicitly exempts them from such requirements. 49 C.F.R. § 37.29(b). The
exemption compels the conclusion that the ADA, as a whole, does not require the
New York City taxi industry to provide accessible taxis.”).
266. Id. at 73.
267. 352 F. Supp. 3d 248 (S.D.N.Y. 2018).
268. Id. at 261 (citing Camarillo v. Carrols Corp., 518 F.3d 153, 156 (2d Cir. 2008)).
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determine whether a rideshare is a “public accommodation” under
Title III. 269
A recent case from the Northern District of Illinois, Access Living
of Metropolitan Chicago. v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 270 evaluated
whether rideshares like Uber were in fact places of “public
accommodation” based on whether the vehicles were a real, physical
space. 271 The Court noted that, “the Third, Fifth, Sixth, and Ninth
Circuits agree with Uber that a place of public accommodation must
be a physical space.” 272 The First Circuit, in Carparts Distribution

Center, Inc. v. Automobile Wholesaler’s Association of New
England, Inc., 273 however, concluded otherwise. 274 The Fifth Circuit
reasoned that the terms listed in section 12181(7) of the ADA are not
only physical places and might encompass, for example, a travel
service that conducts its “business by telephone or correspondence”
because “[i]t would be irrational to conclude that persons who enter
an office to purchase services are protected by the ADA, but persons
who purchase the same services over the telephone or by mail are

269. Id. (“It is premature to decide the question of whether a defendant is a public
accommodation at the motion to dismiss phase.” Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of Cal. v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 103 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1083 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying the
defendant’s motion to dismiss because more factual development was required to
determine whether the defendant, Uber, was a public accommodation under the
ADA)); see Ramos v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-CA-502(XR), 2015 WL 758087, at *6
(W.D. Tex. 2015) (denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss and holding that the
plaintiffs had not failed to prove that Lyft and Uber offer public accommodations
under the ADA. Thus, the court considered defendants to be a covered entity under
Title III of the ADA for the purposes of this motion).
270. 351 F. Supp. 3d 1141 (N.D. Ill. 2018).
271. Id. at 1154; see Leong & Belzer, supra note 190, at 1300 (“Courts have
reached varying conclusions as to whether websites operated by public
accommodations are, themselves, public accommodations for purposes of the ADA.
The most recent precedents, however, tend toward a broader understanding of public
accommodations. In National Federation of the Blind v. Scribd Inc., for example, the
District of Vermont held that Scribd — an online-only document repository — was a
public accommodation within the meaning of Title III of the ADA. The court
reasoned that the meaning of a public accommodation is not limited to physical
places because ‘it would make little sense if a customer who bought insurance from
someone selling policies door to door was not covered but someone buying the same
policy in the parent company’s office was covered. It is highly unlikely Congress
intended such inconsistent results.’”).
272. Access Living of Metro. Chicago, 351 F. Supp. 3d at 1154–55.
273. 37 F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1994).
274. Id. (“In drafting Title III, Congress intended that people with disabilities have
equal access to the array of goods and services offered by private establishments and
made available to those who do not have disabilities.”).
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not.” 275 The Seventh Circuit has also has seemingly followed the First
Circuit, noting
that the owner or operator of a store, hotel, restaurant, dentist’s
office, travel agency, theater, Web site, or other facility (whether in
physical space or in electronic space) that is open to the public
cannot exclude disabled persons from entering the facility and, once
in, from using the facility in the same way that the nondisabled
do. 276

Access Living, falling under the jurisdiction of the Seventh Circuit,
held that Uber was indeed a place of public accommodation because
it does not have to be a physical space. While the Second Circuit has
cited Carparts approvingly, it has not definitively agreed with the
Caparts position. 277
How the Second Circuit resolves whether FHVs are public
accommodations could determine the extent to which companies like
Uber and Lyft are liable under the ADA and other laws engaging
“public accommodations” (like the New York City Human Rights
Law, set forth below). In Noel, the Court’s interpretation of Title
III’s exclusion of taxis was also understood in the context of Title II
— which protects qualified individuals with disabilities from
discrimination on the basis of disability in services, programs, and
activities provided by State and local government entities. Thus, if
FHVs possibly are classified as a “public accommodation,” it could
open a local government up to liability under Title II as well. As in
civil rights claims against state and local governments, 278 plaintiffs
could attempt to sue the TLC directly, but a court would probably
need to construe rideshares as a service provided by the state or local
government itself as a type of “public transportation,” at which time it
is not.
However, this is a fine line of interpretation; to classify FHVs as a
public accommodation, but not as public transportation (as taxis are)
under the ADA would be consistent with the theory that from a
regulatory perspective, FHVs and taxis are justifiably distinct. 279 The
distinction is also not as clear-cut as it may seem, since Ubers operate
in virtually the same market as taxis do. Depending on how
companies expand and develop in the future, the gap between FHVs’
275. Id.
276. Doe v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 179 F.3d 557, 559 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing
Carparts, 37 F.3d at 19).
277. See Pallozzi v. Allstate Life Ins. Co., 198 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 1999).
278. See supra Section II.A.2.
279. See supra Section I.B.
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private-public existence may be closed. As companies like Uber and
Lyft go public this year, and expand their services to operate more
consistently and seamlessly with that of public transit, courts may
start to look at rideshares from the perspective that not only are they
places of public accommodations, but that they step over the line into
“public transportation” territory.

5.

New York City Human Rights Laws

New York City has its own civil rights laws called the New York
City Human Rights Laws (“NYCHRL”), which prohibit a public
accommodation from withholding or refusing to provide full and
equal enjoyment of goods or services based on the following
protected classes: race, color, creed, age, national origin, alienage or
citizenship status, gender, sexual orientation, disability, marital status,
partnership status, caregiver status, uniformed service, any lawful
source of income, status as a victim of domestic violence or status as a
victim of sex offenses or stalking, whether children are, may be or
would be residing with a person or conviction or arrest record. 280
Furthermore, any prejudice, intolerance, bigotry, discrimination, biasrelated violence, or harassment and disorder threatens the rights and
privileges of the City’s inhabitants and is a menace the institutions
and foundation of a free democratic state. 281 The Human Rights Law
thus grants agency authority to eliminate and prevent discrimination
from playing any role in actions relating to public accommodations,
not to mention housing and other real estate, and employment.
The argument can be made that taxis and rideshares are a type of
“public accommodation” in light of a broad reading of Title III of the
ADA, whose definition for “public accommodation” is more
comprehensive than it is in Title II of the Civil Rights Act. 282 Under

280. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 8-101, 8-402, 8-502 (2019).
281. Id.
282. Elizabeth Brown, Fare Trade: Reconciling Public Safety and Gender
Discrimination in Single-Sex Ridesharing, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 367, 394–95
(2017). Brown argues that “legislative and judicial exceptions should be made for
women-only transportation services, allowing sex-based distinctions in both hiring
drivers and accommodating riders, because the social value of public safety outweighs
the interest of gender equality in this unique context. Single-sex rideshare companies
should be permitted to engage in gender discrimination when they can demonstrate
that the purpose and effect of such discrimination is to improve public safety.” Id. at
368. Insofar as rideshares are a “public accommodation” pursuant to Title VI and
ADA, single-sex ridesharing should be exempted from state public accommodation
law because the “public” connotation does not apply to ridesharing per se. Id. at 395.
“Ridesharing is a unique form of public accommodation because, unlike riding a train
or bus, it involves inviting a customer into the driver’s own car . . . . Ridesharing is
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the ADA, discrimination is prohibited in “specified public
transportation,” which is defined as “bus, rail, or any other
conveyance . . . that provides the general public with general or
special service . . . on a regular and continuing basis.” 283 Limiting
access to rideshares in the outer boroughs will be severely hindered if
a permanent cap were to be implemented by the TLC. With
substantial evidence that these negative outcomes will occur, and
guided
by
potential
ADA
understanding
of
“public
accommodations,” aggrieved plaintiffs may be able to contemplate
NYCHLR claims that the TLC denies access to rideshares as public
accommodations.
B.

Int. No. 144-B May Be Preempted by State Law

Fundamentally, the City Council may not have the authority to
grant the TLC the power to permanently limit the number of
rideshares. While state law grants all municipalities the authority to
limit taxicabs, only in two other counties does it expressly expand this
limitation to vehicles other than taxis, and nowhere to vehicles that
are for-hire.

1.

State Law Grants No Municipality the Power to Limit TNC
Vehicles

In passing the new law capping the number of FHVs for one year,
first, the City Council amended the New York City administrative
code to reflect the addition of a study to be conducted by the
Commission of the impact of for-hire vehicles in the City, called the
“vehicle utilization standard.” Second, the Council authorized the
commission to establish and revise these standards for high-volume
for-hire services, and to regulate the number of FHV licenses.
Under Section 2302(a) of the New York City Charter, the
Commission has broad authority to regulate and supervise “the
business and industry of transportation of persons by licensed vehicles
for hire in the city.” This authority includes licensing of taxis and
FHV drivers and owners and the setting of standards for their
conduct. But Int. No. 144-B has extended the commission’s authority
over rideshares like never before. Whether this extension of the

even more private than a taxi. The privately-owned cars rarely have the kind of
structural dividers between the front and back seats, intercoms, or diverting video
screens usually found in taxis.” Id. at 395.
283. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(10) (2012).
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commission’s power to regulate the issuance of new licenses to forhire vehicles by imposing a limit, or cap, on them, is open to question.
While New York City has express authority to “limit the number of
taxicabs to be licensed,” it does not have express authority to limit the
number of FHVs, and in only two counties has this limiting authority
been expanded to other vehicles (none of which are FHVs). 284 Under
New York State law, municipalities have the authority to adopt
ordinances regulating the registration and licensing of taxis
registration, and municipalities may limit the number of taxicabs to be
Furthermore, section 181 of New York General
licensed. 285
Municipal Laws, an ordinance regulating taxicabs and limousines,
states that Westchester county may limit the number of taxicabs and
limousines to be licensed, while Rockland county may limit the
number of taxicabs, limousines, and livery vehicles to be licensed.286
The counties of Nassau, Suffolk, Dutchess, and Ulster, in comparison,
are not expressly granted this authority, even though Nassau, like
Westchester, may adopt ordinances regulating the registration of
taxicabs and limousines, and Suffolk, Dutchess, and Ulster, like
Rockland, may adopt local laws or ordinances regulating the
registration of taxicabs, limousines, and livery vehicles. 287 In other
words, all cities, villages, and towns in New York may limit the
number of licensed taxis, and only in two counties — Westchester and
Rockland —may licensed limousines also be limited (with Rockland
being the sole county authorized to limit livery vehicles as well).
Since the introduction of rideshares into the City, section 181 has
been amended in 2012 (adding the counties of Suffolk and Rockland),
2015 (adding language for “local laws”), and 2016 (adding the
counties of Dutchess and Ulster). Again, this legislative history
shows that distinctions were made regarding whether a county may
limit certain types of vehicles, with no mention ever being made of
FHVs. The municipal general law’s silence as to limiting FHVs is not

284. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 181 (McKinney 2016).
285. Id.
286. Id.; see In re Melrose Credit Union v. City of New York, 76 N.Y.S.3d 579, 579
(App. Div. 2018) (noting the differences between the three types of vehicles available
to passengers for hire in New York are “(1) yellow medallion taxicabs; (2) Street Hail
Liveries, which are green taxicabs; and (3) for-hire vehicles”). “FHVs include livery
cars, luxury limousines, and “black cars,” which are FHVs that are “dispatched from
a central facility . . . , where such central facility has certified to the satisfaction of the
[TLC] that more than ninety percent of the central facility’s for-hire business is on a
payment basis other than direct cash payment by a passenger.” Id. (citing N.Y.C.
ADMIN CODE § 19-502[u]).
287. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 181(McKinney 2016).
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for the state legislature’s lack of trying or contemplation. In the
2015–2016 session, Senate Bill S3538 was introduced in order to
clarify section 181(1). The original bill as proposed read that
ordinances may regulate “[t]he registration and licensing of taxicabs,
limousines, and livery vehicles and may limit the number of taxicabs,
limousines, and livery vehicles to be licensed.” 288 The legislature
could have included “transportation network company vehicles” in
the list of vehicles municipalities could limit but did not.
Regardless, the amended version of this bill (Senate Bill S3538B),
which ultimately passed the Senate and was vetoed by the Governor,
was changed to remove the latter amendment that would have added
“limousines, and livery vehicles” to vehicles that could be limited in
number. In other words, while the legislature may have initially
attempted to authorize municipalities to cap the number of
limousines and livery vehicles, they expressly removed it in later
amendments, effectively keeping taxicabs as the only type of vehicle
that may be capped.
In 2017, New York State passed the TNC Act, which greenlit TNC
operation throughout the state and explicitly excluded New York City
taxicabs and FHVs — over which the New York City Taxi &
Limousine Commission (the “Commission”) already had existing
authority. 289 As the law states, “[t]he purpose of this act is to ensure
the safety, reliability, and cost-effectiveness of transportation network
company (TNC) services within the state of New York and to
preserve and enhance access to these important transportation
options for residents and visitors to the state.” 290 In enacting a
regulatory regime for the state, the legislature proved its awareness of
Section 181, by adding the new regulations to Section 182 (local
regulation of transportation network companies) and had the power
and opportunity to expressly allow municipalities to limit the number
of TNC vehicles. But instead, Section 182 provides counties and cities
with populations over 100,000 the authority to “prohibit the pick-up
of any person by a transportation network company . . . within their
geographic boundaries pursuant to the enactment of a local law or

288. S. 03538, 2015–2016 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2016).
289. N.Y. VEH. & TRAFF. LAW § 1691(1) (McKinney 2017); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW §
182 (McKinney 2016). The law, included in the 2018 state budget, was signed by
Governor Andrew Cuomo on April 10, 2017. It authorizes any county, or a city with
a population of more than 100,000, to prohibit the pick-up of a person by a TNC
within the bounds of the jurisdiction (none of which have done so). S. Res 2009C,
2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
290. S. Res. 1264, 2017–2018 Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2018).
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ordinance,” 291 again, making no mention of “limiting” TNC vehicles,
as it does with taxicabs in Section 181.

2.

What Authority Does the TLC Have?

The City Council, aligned with its broad constitutional home rule
powers conferred on local government, has “in addition to all
enumerated powers,” broad authority to:
adopt local laws which it deems appropriate, which are not
inconsistent with the provisions of this charter or with the
Constitution or laws of the United States or this state, for the good
rule and government of the city; for the order, protection and
government of persons and property; for the preservation of the
public health, comfort, peace and prosperity of the city and its
inhabitants; and to effectuate the purposes and provisions of this
charter or of the other law relating to the city. 292

As a City agency, the TLC has broad authority under the New
York City charter and administrative code to promulgate rules and
regulations that supervise, regulate, and control for-hire vehicles in
the City. 293 Title 35 of the Rules of the City of New York similarly
provides that, “[t]o promote public comfort and convenience, and
taking into account the overall public transportation network of the
City, the [TLC] will establish an overall public transportation policy
governing for-hire transportation services in the City, including taxi,
limousine, paratransit and commuter van services.” 294 Thus, the TLC
has broad authority to implement stand-alone regulations and
regulatory schemes related to the taxi industry. 295
Furthermore, in In re Melrose Credit Union v. City of New
York, 296 the Court elaborated that the TLC’s authority included the
power to adopt “E-Hail” and “FHV E-Dispatch” rules for rideshares
like Ubers, which “establish regulations for E-Hail and E-Payment
that will encourage innovation, provide desired services to taxi

291. N.Y. GEN. MUN. Law § 182 (McKinney 2016). Additionally, the law added
other provisions regarding licensing, driver background checks (but, controversially,
not fingerprinting), required disclosure to passengers, and insurance. Id.
292. N.Y.C. CHARTER § 28 (2019).
293. N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 19-501 (2019); N.Y.C. CHARTER § 2300.
294. 35 R.C.N.Y. § 52-01.
295. N.Y.C. Comm. for Taxi Safety v. N.Y.C. Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 681
N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (App. Div. 1998) (noting that the City Charter delegates the
Commission a “broad grant of authority . . . to promulgate and implement a
pervasive regulatory program for the taxicab industry, including . . . requirements for
the maintenance of financial security”).
296. 76 N.Y.S.3d 579 (App. Div. 2018).
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passengers, promote safety and consumer protection, and create
income opportunities for drivers.” 297 The goal of the E-Hail Rules is
to “accommodate new technology into the taxi industry while taking
into account the needs of E-Hail application developers, drivers,
vehicle owners and passengers.” 298 This ruling narrowly explained
the TLC’s authority with respect to regulations regarding rideshare
vehicles.

3.

Preemption?

New York State can indicate its intent to preempt an area of law
either by express statutory language, clearly indicating it has
While no specific
preempted the field, or by implication. 299
preemption language is involved in the matter here, preemption may
be inferred if the state establishes a “comprehensive and detailed
regulatory scheme.” 300 Uber argues the latter point, pointing to the
State’s Fix NYC Advisory Panel Report. 301 In establishing the Fix
NYC Advisory Panel Report, the State may have implicitly
preempted the City from making rules pertaining to capping
rideshares because the report urges consideration of reducing the
rates for rideshare carpools, and implementation of a congestion
pricing surcharge on FHVs, with the revenues going towards MTA
improvement. 302 Ultimately, legislation that imposes caps on the
number of for-hire vehicles that can operate in the congestion zone
could depress anticipated revenues the MTA would receive through
the surcharge on for-hire vehicles. 303
There are many reasons why the preemption argument is valid with
respect to the new law. At one time, the state contemplated, then
withdrew, an amendment to the law that would give municipalities
authority to limit TNCs. The state also created an aspirational, statewide regulatory plan wherein rideshare vehicles play an integral role
in not just decreasing congestion but raising revenue for the MTA.

297. Id. at 584.
298. Id.
299. McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 965 N.Y.S.2d 811, 815 (Sup. Ct.
2013), aff’d, McDonald v. N.Y.C. Campaign Fin. Bd., 985 N.Y.S.2d 557 (App. Div.
2014).
300. Id.
301. See generally FIX NYC ADVISORY PANEL, FIX NYC ADVISORY PANEL
REPORT (2018), http://www.hntb.com/hntb/media/hntbmedialibrary/home/fix-nycpanel-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB96-XPQB].
302. Id.
303. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 10.
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Lastly, as a policy matter, a law of this sort is not merely local in
character, but national (and perhaps even international).
What is most troubling here is that local legislators have given
broad authority to the TLC to regulate FHVs in a way that the state
legislature has done only narrowly, and in a way that no other city —
big or small — has done before. Simply put, municipal legislators
invariably have the authority to adopt certain taxi and rideshare
vehicle regulations because it impacts the health and safety of the
City’s citizens. 304 But the threshold of their power to regulate is not
unlimited. It must be beyond the scope of a city council, even one as
large and powerful as New York City’s, to delegate to an agency the
authority to limit the growth of a company, where the state has not
explicitly granted them that power, and especially more so in an area
where this practice is unprecedented. The manner and form of
rideshare regulations — from licensing and background checks — is
within the scope of local authority. As a threshold question, where a
municipality’s right to ban rideshares is expressly delegated, the right
to arbitrarily cap rideshare licenses is not symmetrically defined and
therefore cannot be assumed.
Before the rise of rideshares, no other type of vehicle, except taxis,
was permitted to pick up passengers right off the street. And the
many instances of black livery cars being fined for attempting to pick
up street hails in the outer boroughs underscores even further how
Uber and other rideshare vehicles has filled a gap. But this
phenomenon does not make ridesharing a local problem, or solution,
depending on which side of the table one sits. Limiting rideshares
with a permanent cap is not within the authority of a city and should
not be under the authority of a city because it is part of a larger
industry. There is no turning back the clock and disassembling the
entire rideshare industry; the sharing economy is here to stay.
III. RETHINKING RIDESHARE REGULATION
Section III.A. first proposes that legislators of major cities not seek
to impose strict regulations like a permanent capping mechanism on
rideshare vehicles. Second, Section III.B. advances alternatives to a

304. G&C Transp., Inc. v. McGrane, 928 N.Y.S.2d 208, 214 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (“N.Y.
Gen. Mun. Law § 181 did not preempt a municipality’s authority to adopt taxicab
regulations because (1) the statute authorized the municipality to adopt such
regulations that were consistent with state law, and (2) N.Y. Const. art. IX, §
2(c)(ii)(10) and N.Y. Mun. Home Rule Law § 10(1)(ii)(a)(12) conferred broad police
power on local government related to the welfare of a municipality’s citizens.”), aff’d,
949 N.Y.S.2d 113 (App. Div. 2012).
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blanket cap on rideshares, such as congestion pricing (that contains a
poverty exemption) and providing subsidies for rides.
Regulators should ultimately embrace, rather than impede, the
innovative aspects of FHVs as a way to expand access to low-income,
minority, and disabled residents, instead of imposing regulatory
schemes that are proven to aggravate disparities in transit equity.
Rideshares like Ubers are distinct from taxis, even from a legal
standpoint, and so they deserve different regulations and protections.
A. Avoid Overly Strict Regulations
For various reasons, the market will, for better or for worse, selfregulate, deeming a cap not just draconian, but unnecessary. Uber
has finally gone public, and only time will tell if the company can
overcome its lackluster debut and start to turn a profit — especially if
autonomous, driverless vehicles are the future. 305 A portion of the
company’s losses are on account of subsidized rides, so for the
company to begin creating a profit, the cost of rideshares will likely go
up. A permanent cap on rideshares would further raise prices and
disproportionately impact low-income and minority riders.
Ultimately, capping rideshares is a counterproductive regulatory
scheme and sends an overly restrictive message against innovative
new companies and industries that are adapting to technological
changes and societal needs.
B.

1.

Alternatives to Capping Rideshares

Utilize Rideshares Alongside Public Transit

New York City should consider merging private rideshares with
public transportation because this will improve residents’ quality of
life by creating multiple accessible transit options. For example, one
opportunity for City officials to capitalize on ridesharing is by
providing first and last mile travel subsidies, or subsidies that cover
rides to and from popular transit hubs in the outer boroughs, which
would encourage rides to destinations outside the typical transit zone
or underserved by public transit. For example, in 2016, Pinellas
Suncoast Transit Authority in St. Petersburg, Florida, became the
first agency in the country to subsidize Uber trips. 306 The Authority

305. See Hawkins, supra note 49.
306. See Laura Bliss, Where Ride-Hailing and Transit Go Hand in Hand, CITYLAB
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/08/where-ride-hailingand-transit-go-hand-in-hand/566651/ [https://perma.cc/AQ9C-STPT]; see also JOSEPH
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gave $5.00 discounts on Uber and Lyft rides, as well on rides provided
by a local taxi company, to and from twenty-four popular bus stops in
its service area to as many as 1000 riders per month. 307
And since 2016, at least twenty-seven more communities across the
United States (including Los Angeles and Marin, California; Denver,
Colorado; Detroit, Michigan; Portland, Oregon; Boston,
Massachusetts; Washington, D.C.; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania)
have partnered with Uber, Lyft, and other rideshare companies “to
supplement or substitute traditional service.” 308 The Denver suburb
of Centennial, Colorado provided free Lyft trips to light rail
stations, 309 while in Washington, D.C., the fire and EMS department
is exploring ways to contract Uber to transport non-emergency 911
callers. 310
At the very least for ADA passengers, a partnership between
public transit and private rideshares would be incredibly more costefficient than current paratransit systems in place. 311 In Boston, The
Ride (a door-to-door transportation service for residents who are
disabled and elderly) costs $31.00 per ride and has a budget of over
$100 million a year; but under a program between the Massachusetts
Bay Transportation Authority and rideshare companies like Uber
and Lyft, every Uber and Lyft ride will cost the agency $13.00 per
ride. 312
With both Uber and Lyft now expanding their businesses into
scooters and bikes, incorporating a more seamless and integrated

P.
SCHWIETERMAN
ET
AL.,
PARTNERS
IN
TRANSIT
5
(2018),
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1cJtCJ-7JctKh8fsYyY3AidrETdKGx8wz/view
[https://perma.cc/F3U9-JDTF].
307. See Bliss, supra note 306.
308. Id.
309. However, the pilot program in Centennial, Colorado was not extended due to
insufficient demand. Id.
310. See SCHWIETERMAN ET AL., supra note 306, at 11.
311. Luz Lazo, Uber, Lyft Partner with Transportation Authority to Offer
Paratransit Customers Service in Boston, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-gridlock/wp/2016/09/16/uber-lyft-partnerwith-city-to-offer-paratransit-customers-on-demand-service-in-boston/
[https://perma.cc/6CRV-KVN5]; see, e.g., Tayjus Surampudi, The MBTA’s On

Demand Paratransit Pilot Program: A Case for Public Transit Agencies to Partner
with Uber and Lyft to Improve Paratransit, MEDIUM (Oct. 18, 2018),

https://medium.com/@tssurampudi/the-mbtas-on-demand-paratransit-pilot-programa-case-for-public-transit-agencies-to-partner-with-2815a53f939c
[https://perma.cc/67ZT-XNVM].
312. See Lazo, supra note 311; see also Athena Kan, Ride-Sharing to Replace
MBTA’s RIDE, MEDIUM (Apr. 28, 2018), https://medium.com/@kan_academy/ridesharing-to-replace-mbtas-ride-fa0bd142e9f3 [https://perma.cc/34M5-49ZW].
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rideshare system (between traditional public transit, rideshare
vehicles, bikes, and scooters) is even more easily foreseeable.
Partnering with Uber and Lyft would also allow New York transit
agencies to complement public transit at a time when transit ridership
is on the decline due to inadequate, inefficient, and overcrowded
system that underserves a significant portion of the City’s population.
There is great demand to improve transit infrastructure, and linking
on-demand transportation with traditional transit services could be a
way to increase ridership while providing reliable service to all riders
especially those in transit deserts, areas plagued by poor transit
options.

2.

Implement Congestion Pricing

Now that congestion pricing for Manhattan’s central business
district, or the geographical area below 60th street, was officially
passed in New York City on April 1, 2019, the City — the first to
implement such pricing — should take care devising a hardship
exemption. 313 Congestion pricing will include surcharging rides in
zones where transit is most plentiful and reliable and congestion costs
are highest while charging little or nothing else for rides elsewhere,
where these conditions are reversed. 314 In addition to reducing
traffic, congestion pricing will raise funds that could be allocated to
the MTA. Using data like pick-up and drop-off information for
rideshares and taxis could help regulators identify which areas are
most congested and therefore which areas require congestion fees.315
Moreover, Uber supports congestion pricing in Manhattan as long as

313. See, e.g., Lauren Cook, Congestion Pricing in NYC: What to Know About the
Manhattan Toll Plan, AMNEWYORK (Apr. 2, 2019, 12:42 PM),

https://www.amny.com/transit/congestion-pricing-nyc-1.29251703
[https://perma.cc/8FU6-U4PX]; Emma G. Fitzsimmons & Winnie Hu, Congestion
Pricing Is Coming. Now Everyone Wants a Break., N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/nyregion/congestion-pricing-trucks-newjersey.html [https://perma.cc/8JMY-ARDN].
314. Charles Komanoff, No Uber-Lyft Cap Needed Because New York Can Price
Its Way Out of Congestion and Despair, STREETS BLOG NYC (July 31, 2018),
https://nyc.streetsblog.org/2018/07/31/no-uber-lyft-cap-needed-because-new-yorkcan-price-its-way-out-of-congestion-and-despair/
[https://perma.cc/NL22-9ZMA]
(“[I]t’s now state policy devised as a mass transit revenue-raiser that’s scheduled to
take effect on New Year’s Day when for-hire vehicle rides that touch the Manhattan
taxi zone will be surcharged $2.50 for yellow cabs and $2.75 for Ubers and Lyfts. A
surcharge on time traveled in the taxi zone would have been more effective than the
legislature’s flat fee, but the policy should make at least a modest dent in Manhattan
gridlock by deterring a fraction of rides.”).
315. See Speta, supra note 70, at 131.
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the pricing applies to all vehicles. 316 Congestion pricing has been
imposed on traffic in the busy central business districts of other major
cities, 317 including London, where congestion pricing successfully
reduced private car use 39% between 2002 and 2014. 318
Ironically, when Mayor de Blasio criticized congestion pricing
proposals back in 2017, he did so because he asserted it would be a
burden on outer-borough residents. 319 In actuality, only 4% of
employed outer-borough residents — about 118,000 — commute to
work in Manhattan by car, and only 2% of those who do — about
5000 — are considered to be poor, or living under the federal poverty
limit. 320
Schaller reports that “[a] multi-pronged strategy that is anchored
around a comprehensive congestion pricing plan that charges all
vehicles entering the central business district below 60th Street in
Manhattan is far more likely to produce positive results than
imposing artificial caps on FHVs.” 321 Rather than replicate the taxi
medallion system, which imposes a numerical cap and leads “to
artificial inflation of medallion values and economic distress,”
Schaller supports implementing a congestion pricing plan that “would
impose fees on drivers of personal, commercial, and for-hire
vehicles.” 322 These fees could then be used to raise revenue to fix,

316. Winnie Hu, When Calling an Uber Can Pay Off for Cities and States, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/18/nyregion/uber-lyft-publictransit-congestion-tax.html [https://perma.cc/AE6F-TRXT] (“A comprehensive
congestion pricing plan that is applied to all vehicles in the central business district is
the best way to fully fund mass transit, reduce congestion and improve transportation
for outer borough New Yorkers.”).
317. Theodore Brown, Five Cities with Congestion Pricing, THISBIGCITY (Aug. 22,
2011),
http://thisbigcity.net/five-cities-with-congestion-pricing/
[https://perma.cc/3QGB-FLF5].
318. Nicole Badstuber, London’s Congestion Charge Is Showing Its Age, CITYLAB
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/transportation/2018/04/londons-congestioncharge-needs-updating/557699/ [https://perma.cc/EH2L-MZUM] (“The number of
vehicles driving into Central London is a quarter lower than a decade ago. The
charge has been particularly successful at deterring personal use cars from entering
Central London: the number of private cars entering the zone fell 39 percent between
2002 and 2014.”).
319. Vincent Barone, Congestion Pricing Impact on Outer-Borough Residents
Would be Nominal, Analysis Shows, AMNEWYORK (Oct. 24, 2017, 8:22 PM),
https://www.amny.com/transit/congestion-pricing-nyc-1.14604676
[https://perma.cc/ZF86-AQ4B].
320. Id.
321. See HIRE CONGESTION, supra note 51, at 5.
322. Id. at 10.
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improve, and maintain public transit, which Schaller argues is the
“most equitable form of transportation in New York City.” 323
CONCLUSION
New York City would not be promulgating an effective or legal
regulation by enacting a permanent cap on the number of rideshares
in the City. Such a limit exacerbates existing problems of transit
inequality, especially for outer borough residents. City council
members, transit experts and advocates, and rideshare companies
recognize the disparate impact and discriminatory externalities that a
cap on FHVs would impose on riders living in the outer boroughs and
any community that suffers from inadequate access to transportation.
While it is essential for the New York City Council and the City’s
TLC to prioritize the more significant and systemic public transit
issues, these entities should also recognize that FHVs are an
invaluable supplement to the public transit system, particularly for
the low-income and minority riders living outside of Manhattan.
FHVs are offering transportation options to the most underserved
members of New York City’s population and fill a key gap created by
an underinvested and discriminatory transit system. Limitations on
FHVs simply cause too great of a disparate impact on the City’s most
vulnerable residents.
Underlying the potentially discriminatory impact of a rideshare cap
is the more significant, national issue of unequal access to public
transit. As asserted by the Civil Rights Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice’s Title VI Legal Manual, social psychological
research proves that implicit bias against people of color continues to
be a widespread problem. 324 From an inequality perspective, there
are greater implications from capping Uber regarding equal access to
transportation insofar that it stifles innovation rather than producing
potential solutions. Better public transit could result if local
governments were to embrace technological innovations as positive
transportation opportunities. Uber and other rideshares could be a
keystone for this transportation puzzle, and may not merely mitigate
transit inequality in the outer boroughs but instead solve these
greater transit inequality issues. It would be unjust for policymakers
in New York to sideline the concerns of outer borough residents by
implementing a scheme that will ultimately harm disadvantaged
populations.

323. Id. at 9.
324. C.R. DIVISION, supra note 241, at 4.
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Rather than extend this one-year moratorium, the City should
focus its efforts on enforcing taxes for drivers in congested zones.
This will better address the undeniable problems of traffic congestion
in New York City without removing a vital transit service from the
City’s most marginalized residents.
Rideshare platforms are an undeniable part of the fabric of urban
life. They have not only changed the transportation landscape by
providing on-demand car service; they have the potential to operate
in a more integrated manner with public transit and provide
substantially more access to transit and help residents in every area of
the five boroughs escape the transit desert. Instead of banning these
valuable services, cities should work with these companies to offer
better transit for all.

